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Executive summary 
 
Integrated energy (electricity generation) policy is by no means a settled issue in the post-
apartheid era in South Africa. The policy framework is predicated on the need for new and 
additional energy generation capacity. It assumes that coal will continue to remain the 
dominant source for electricity generation, but accepts that future energy generation will 
require an energy mix rather than primarily depending on a single form of electricity 
generation. In the past decade, however, the policy space has become increasingly fluid and 
contested by a variety of vested interests, as renewable energy (wind and solar power) has 
gained a serious foothold and has been championed by a variety of private and public sector 
actors. However, what is not clear, and is often muddled in the discourse, despite seeming 
clarity within official policy frameworks, is what the investment strategy should be, where this 
additional electricity energy generation should be sourced from, what the precise elements of 
the ‘mix’ should be, and which path to achieve it should be followed. 
 
The central aim of this study is to investigate the power dimensions and struggles between 
these various interests and illustrate how they have manifested in terms of the different 
outcomes. The report therefore provides insight into how the political economy environment 
has impacted the unfolding of South Africa’s climate change policy, with a specific focus on 
the deployment of private sector-driven renewable energies – through the stillborn 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) programme, followed by South Africa’s first 
successful Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme       
(RE IPPPP). 
 
The report identifies the complex array of actors and institutions determining climate change 
policy in renewables. The differing aims, priorities and objectives of the key stakeholders are 
set out. These stakeholders are subject to a set of direct and indirect factors that influence 
their decision-making processes. A detailed analysis of the evolution of these motivating 
drivers is necessary to answer the central political economy questions underlying an analysis 
of the South African case: to what extent are the stakeholders and policies driven by climate 
change considerations? Or have the discussion, policy formulation, and implementation 
dynamics of electricity generation been driven by issues of energy security and cost? How 
has the discussion opened up the policy space for advocates of renewable energy to drive 
their particular agenda? What are the co-benefits that have driven such sustainability 
policies? And finally, how have the political economy coalitions of stakeholders, both 
supporting and opposing sustainable energy policies, emerged to push their own agendas?  
 
This report is based on a desktop review of existing literature and interviews with a number 
of key informants comprising specialist experts or stakeholder representatives. On this basis 
we have set out a review of the existing state of the literature, and identified spaces for 
adding knowledge. Much of the existing political economy literature utilises the concept of the 
minerals-energy complex (MEC) as a point of departure for analysis of South Africa’s current 
renewable energy policy landscape. We regard this as a limiting and inappropriate analytic 
foundation for understanding South Africa’s political economy and its historical process of 
economic accumulation. The MEC confuses interlinkages with expressions of political power, 
and we do not regard it as a useful conceptual framework to develop a clear understanding 
of the political economy dynamics that drive the energy inter-relationships. For this reason 
we have adopted a different conceptual framework and methodology.  
 
This study analyses the events that have transpired over the past two decades utilising the 
PEACH methodology, orchestrated by the Institute of Development Studies (Schmitz 2012). 
The PEACH methodology is concerned with answering the central question of the project: 
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who drives/obstructs climate change policies? It provides a method of mapping stakeholders 
and their respective objectives with regard to periods of transformative change. It is based on 
identifying the various stakeholders involved, including their diverse priorities, and mapping 
them in a power priority matrix according to their direct and indirect influence on 
policymaking and implementation.  
 
We have added several components to the PEACH methodology to enhance our analysis. 
The first is the customisation of the PEACH matrix to account for the unique dynamics of 
South Africa’s energy sector. Second, we have incorporated value chain dynamics into the 
framework so as to establish the drivers of the chain, the constraints operating at different 
links, and the struggles between different actors within the chain. This allows the analysis to 
unpack how the state-owned electricity enterprise (ESKOM) is present at all value chain 
levels and acts as a key driver, facilitating and/or constraining policy formulation and 
implementation. Third, we have represented these various struggles within a structural 
periodisation so as to introduce historical dynamism into the analysis. The political economy 
dynamics and struggles between the various stakeholders (actors, interest groups, and 
institutions) have shifted and changed during different periods. Much of this is attributable to 
different stakeholders expressing their vested interests or through mobilising coalitions of 
power. Finally, the political economy analysis also has to take into account unintended 
consequences. These, albeit driven by other motives and actions, open up alternative 
spaces and create opportunities which different stakeholders are able to take advantage of 
and so change what previously appeared to be fixed trajectories of development.  
 
The report starts with a chronological policy inventory providing a progression of climate 
change-related policymaking in South Africa. These policies are dealt with in more detail in 
dynamic form exploring the complex dynamics behind policymaking and policy 
implementation in the political economy analysis that follows in later sections. Hence the 
policy overview is followed by an outline of the relevant stakeholders involved in South 
Africa’s climate change policies, focusing particularly on the creation and implementation of 
South Africa’s current Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 
Programme (RE IPPPP). The stakeholder inventory identifies the key actors and institutions 
exercising power and influencing policy providing a static picture of how they fit into the 
overall political economy mosaic. This static representation of power and influence relates 
these stakeholders to their various priority objectives, mapping those that are directly 
concerned with climate change mitigation and those that have other more indirect priority 
aims.  
 
The key lessons from these inventories are the following. Climate change mitigation is not a 
major motivating priority of the key stakeholders, especially those with high levels of 
influence. The primary driving force of government and business is to ensure reliable energy 
supply. This is a function of the crisis in electricity supply that has plagued the economy 
since the turn of the millennium.  
 
ESKOM, South Africa’s vertically integrated state-owned energy utility, holds monopoly 
power over the electricity value chain linkages of generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electricity. It is essentially three businesses located within one entity. The emphasis on 
generation turnover within ESKOM has translated to an asymmetrical internal power 
structure within the utility. Coal-based generation priorities are elevated above the needs of 
the transmission and distribution sectors, and are the driving force behind ESKOM’s actions. 
Attempts to introduce independent power producers (whether renewable or coal-based 
power stations) into the value chain are viewed as threatening to ESKOM’s majority market 
share, and met with suspicion.  
 
The electricity crisis maintains ESKOM’s position of relative influence, since no 
actor/institution is going to rock the boat and threaten energy security. Although the price of 
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electricity for final consumers is a major issue, the institutional level of influence consumers 
have is limited. However, the need to ameliorate the escalating cost of electricity for 
businesses and households also opens some relative space for those pushing for renewable 
energy as additional sources of electricity supply to clip ESKOM’s wings. Given the need to 
maintain energy security, there is an intricate balancing act taking place between the major 
stakeholders over shoring up ESKOM and developing independent power producers (IPPs) 
as an additional form of renewable energy supply.  
 
The three-fold periodisation of the analytic narrative provides a dynamic element to the 
political economy analysis of power and influence. It situates the various stakeholders in the 
shifting flux of policy change during the past 20 years and provides a historical 
contextualisation to the current situation.  
Building a policy framework and ESKOM’s role in flux:        
1998–2005 
In 1998, international pressure to privatise and diversify, coupled with support from the 
private sector and residential consumers, allowed a policy framework to be put in place that 
sanctioned the restructuring of ESKOM and the entry of IPPs. However, no regulatory 
framework for IPP procurement was established, rendering implementation of the new 
policies impossible.  
 
Furthermore, electricity prices in South Africa during this period were among the lowest in the 
world, which ultimately deterred private sector actors from entering the market, especially 
those in renewable energy. Faced with a looming energy crisis, government gave way to 
pressure from industry, unions, and voters to maintain the energy supply at low prices and 
abandoned its plans for restructuring ESKOM.  
 
Any attempt within government to build a coalition of influence in favour of renewable energy 
supply melted away when faced with the energy security crisis and the power of the 
ESKOM/Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) lobby. At the end of the period, ESKOM 
remained a vertically integrated monopoly power maintaining control over the value chain – 
the incumbent regime was preserved.  
 
As Eberhard sums up, ‘Policy developments ran ahead of the political process… There was 
thus never any strong political leadership to implement the proposed reforms’ (Eberhard 
2005: 5316). In short, policy formation was influenced and driven by private energy analysts 
and international consultants providing backing to government officials, but it lacked the 
political backing necessary for implementation.  
Conflicting energy policies and political gridlock: 2005–2009 
ESKOM was able to use the energy security crisis to exercise influence and mount a 
pressure campaign to maintain itself as the monopoly player in energy generation, and so 
retain control over the value chain. At the same time, the very means of doing this, through 
increasing prices, coalesced stakeholders into the beginnings of a counter campaign.  
 
In 2005, ESKOM began its generation expansion programme with plans to build two very 
large ‘clean coal’ power plants, Medupi and Kusile. However, the decision to invest in new 
capacity building was made too late. In 2007/08, South Africa faced rolling blackouts as a 
result of a decade of rapid electrification programmes and industrial growth, with no 
additional generation capacity to account for the substantial increases in demand.  
 
In 2006, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), in response to pressure 
from ESKOM, began enacting sharp increases in electricity tariffs to fund the generation 
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expansion programme. The impact of these increases on industries, municipalities, and 
everyday consumers resulted in mounting pressure from these stakeholder groups to restrict 
tariff increases in the future. As the regulator, NERSA was caught in between two opposing 
forces – the pressure from ESKOM to increase revenue in order to secure energy supply in 
the future and the pressure from industry (including the highly influential Energy Intensive 
Users Group (EIUG) to keep prices low in order to maintain South Africa’s historical global 
competitive advantage.  
 
At the same time as the energy crisis, NERSA began developing REFIT, which garnered 
intense interest from international private sector actors seeking new investment opportunities 
in response to the global economic downturn and oversaturation of renewable energy 
markets in Europe. The planning of the REFIT was plagued with policy incoherency, 
uncertainty, and confusion – the result of continued resistance from an incumbent regime 
battling to maintain control over energy generation. 
From Copenhagen to REFIT to RE IPPPP: 2010–2014 
The energy security crisis and the loss of confidence in ESKOM’s ability to adequately 
address the crisis catalysed the Treasury to explore renewable energy alternatives by 
allowing a small unit skilled in creating public–private partnerships to have its head in 
investigating setting up IPPs. This unit occupied space adjacent to the Department of Energy 
(DoE) building, operating and giving credit as if it was institutionally located there, coalesced 
a coalition of public and private sector support around its activities, and produced a 
competitive bidding implementation platform, the Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producer Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP), which allowed IPP investment to take off 
and drive tariff prices down in the process.  
 
This coalition allowed the DoE to intervene decisively in the policy space, passing new 
legislation, confining NERSA’s activities to regulation only and removing its IPP selection 
role, and effectively clipping some of ESKOM’s power to control purchasing from IPPs. The 
IPP Unit was able effectively to isolate ESKOM and its government backer, the DPE, from 
the renewable energy bidding process. The institutional nature of the IPP Unit was crucial. It 
comprised a small group of individuals that did not bureaucratically fall under the watch of 
any single department. This contributed to its success in building a coalition of influence 
within government. Essentially operating as a proxy for the DoE but, with the tacit backing of 
the Treasury, not having to work within the DoE’s internal procedures, it was able to operate 
unknown to any other stakeholders long enough to gain the momentum necessary to ensure 
that the process would not be stopped. This unit managed to create the joined-up 
government that was necessary to move beyond the normal state silos that act to constipate 
and stifle innovation.  
 
ESKOM never publicly blocked any progress towards an IPP renewable energy programme, 
but rather employed a strategy of using its control over the value chain to delay the process 
until the proposed programme eventually met its demise. It was a tactic described by one 
interviewee as ‘malicious compliance – they always project that they are on board, they will 
never say that they disagree with a government policy, but they will do what they can to stop 
it’. The strategy had worked before with REFIT, which had been overwhelmed by policy 
incoherency, regulatory confusion, missed deadlines and, most crucially, the lack of strong 
stakeholder influence within government driving it. ESKOM did not believe that RE IPPPP 
would work. It thought it would follow the same trajectory as REFIT.  
 
RE IPPPP pulled in substantial vested interest from the private sector and increased its zone 
of influence. The nature of the process involved large foreign firms investing in renewable 
energy generation. The competitive bidding process gave the banks a pre-eminent status 
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since they carried most of the risk. The entry of such major players in the private sector 
effectively acted to change the nature of the game.  
 
There are a number of serious challenges facing the renewable energy sector which may 
well destabilise the coalition, and produce a variety of differing outcomes. The demand for 
the institutionalisation of the IPP Unit, and the fact that its strength is derived from floating 
between departments, is also its potential Achilles heel. Structural shifts in investment away 
from bank-backed, project-funded bids towards international corporate-guaranteed 
investment can play a role in decreasing competition, local investment and local content. The 
economic development requirements are in danger of not delivering local economic activity 
and meeting social development needs. In the absence of a tightly controlled monitoring and 
evaluation process they are also a recipe for facilitating corruption. Finally, ESKOM’s 
continued monopoly control over the value chain constrains the growth of the IPPs and their 
ability to connect to the transmission grid. 
 
In conclusion, the driving force pushing South Africa into renewable energy policies and 
modalities of implementation was not a result of a major commitment to addressing the 
issues of climate change. The change in the renewable energy policy debate and policy 
implementation was triggered by a crisis in the supply of electricity. This crisis has its roots in 
the governance of the electricity value chain, which took the form of a vertically integrated set 
of linkages (covering generation, transmission and distribution) internalised within the public 
sector-owned company, ESKOM.  
 
The result shifted the balance of forces in the energy political economy space away from 
ESKOM’s paralysing grip over the value chain. This has resulted in the current structural 
break with the previous period, manifested in policy shifts and operational changes, reflecting 
the power of a new coalition of influence in the political economy of renewables. In the public 
sector its core is comprised of the Treasury, DoE, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
(DEA) and NERSA, with conditional support from the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). Private sector core support is principally derived from the foreign-owned IPP 
companies and other ancillary business professionals/owners tied to, or benefiting from, their 
operations. Whether this leads to the required corporate unbundling of ESKOM and an 
electricity value chain operating without its stultifying monopoly control is the political 
economy challenge facing a new coalition for change.  
 
The key stakeholders arraigned against change are ESKOM and DPE. They form a powerful 
and substantial bloc whose strength is not to be underestimated. They are simply keeping 
their powder dry since fundamentally at core their interests and control over the electricity 
value chain are not threatened. ESKOM’s occupation of the coal-generation capacity space 
going forward is still overwhelmingly substantial, and its grasp over the IPP agenda has 
simply been loosened. Existing discussion taking place in government of expanding the IPP 
terrain to include private sector coal-fuelled power plants is a threat to ESKOM’s monopoly 
control over the coal-based energy generation link. Moreover, although there is not yet a 
serious attempt to unbundle the vertically integrated value chain of generation, transmission 
and distribution under its public sector governance, this might be viewed as the thin edge of 
the wedge. On the renewable energy front ESKOM is simply lying dormant, albeit grumpily 
and in bad faith. If the break-up of the integrated value chain is put on a serious policy 
agenda then ESKOM is most likely to strike back with some considerable exercise of power. 
In addition, if the unbundling process were to happen, and if it were viewed by ESKOM as 
directly linked to the renewable energy policy direction or as a process of privatisation, then 
the unions are likely to swing substantially against a green-growth energy trajectory.  
 
In summary then, the structural shift creating a formal platform for a renewable energy path 
was heavily dependent on building a supportive coalition of stakeholders across a diverse 
base. The formal programme has been created. The rules of engagement by IPPs have 
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been accepted. A dynamic with significant momentum in this direction has been unleashed. 
Large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been invested. The balance of forces 
driving electricity generation has significantly shifted over the past few years. In short, the 
political economy terrain has altered significantly. However, the future trajectory of 
sustainable energy is by no means assured.  
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1 Introduction 
 
This situation calls for a radical transformation of the energy sector, to develop a 
sustainable energy mix that comprises coal, solar, wind, hydro, gas and nuclear 
energy. 
(President Jacob Zuma, State of the Nation address 2014) 
 
Integrated energy (electricity generation) policy is by no means a settled issue in the post-
apartheid era in South Africa. The policy framework is predicated on the need for new and 
additional energy generation capacity. It assumes that coal will continue to remain the 
dominant source for electricity generation, but accepts that future energy generation will 
require an energy mix rather than primarily depending on a single form of electricity 
generation. However, what is not clear, and is often muddled in the discussion, despite 
seeming clarity within official policy frameworks, is what the investment strategy should be, 
where this additional electricity energy generation should be sourced from, what the precise 
elements of the ‘mix’ should be, and which path to achieve it should be followed.  
 
In recent years, renewable energy, the Cinderella which until recently has been covered in 
dirty coal dust, suddenly appeared in policy frameworks and practical implementation 
activities as a viable alternative to decades of total reliance on coal-fired power stations and 
attracted large amounts of international investment from the private sector. However, this mix 
of sustainable policy options is by no means settled, stable and secure. The political agenda 
of various actors in government, including the President, reflects a variety of different 
positions that pop up at unexpected times to muddy the waters. Nuclear energy, which 
appeared to have been put on the back burner, has suddenly reared its head as President 
Zuma’s preferred option, despite not making financial sense in the current stringent times the 
economy is facing. This contributes to the confusion and various interpretations of zigzagging 
in policy discussion, fuelled by the recent hurried signing of confidential ‘framework 
agreements’ to explore the building of eight nuclear reactors – first with Russia, and then 
France and South Korea – and rumours of secret promises and backhander payments to 
prominent members of the ruling party.1  
 
The formulation of energy policy (electricity) and its implementation have been a contested 
terrain. Coal-based power, supplemented by a single nuclear power station, has dominated 
the institutional and economic environment. In the past decade, however, the policy space 
has become increasingly fluid and contested by a variety of vested interests, as renewable 
energy (wind and solar power) has gained a serious foothold and has been championed by a 
variety of private and public sector actors.  
 
The central aim of this study is to investigate the power dimensions and struggles between 
these various interests and illustrate how they have manifested in terms of the different 
outcomes. The report therefore provides insight into how the political economy environment 
has impacted the unfolding of South Africa’s climate change policy, with a specific focus on 
the deployment of private sector-driven renewable energies – through the stillborn 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) programme, followed by South Africa’s first 
successful Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme     
(RE IPPPP). These renewable energy policies and programmes have attracted increasing 
                                                        
1 There have been a raft of reports in the newspapers on these issues. The Witness (24 October 2014) reported on a secret 
conference in the Drakensberg between South African government representatives and officials from Russia’s state atomic 
energy company Rosatom where the details of the deal were discussed. Details of secret meetings and agreements between 
Presidents Zuma and Putin were revealed by the Mail & Guardian (17 October 2014), as well as the opposition of the National 
Treasury to the proposal. The leader of the opposition, Helen Zille, publicly said ‘someone is up to no good’ and accused Zuma 
of acting as if the ‘fiscus is his to plunder’ (Fin24 29 September 2014). 
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international and domestic attention because they are central to mitigating climate change. 
Understanding who drives or blocks these climate-relevant policies is the central concern of 
the PEACH project orchestrated by the Institute of Development Studies 
(www.ids.ac.uk/project/who-drives-climate-policies-in-the-rising-powers). 
 
The report follows the structure and methodology suggested by the PEACH project (Schmitz 
2012). It identifies the complex array of actors and institutions determining climate change 
policy in renewables. The differing aims, priorities and objectives of the key stakeholders are 
set out. These stakeholders are subject to a set of direct and indirect factors that influence 
their decision-making processes. A detailed analysis of the evolution of these motivating 
drivers is necessary to answer the central political economy questions underlying an analysis 
of the South African case: to what extent are the stakeholders and policies driven by climate 
change considerations? Or have the discussion, policy formulation, and implementation 
dynamics of electricity generation been driven by issues of energy security and cost? How 
has this discussion opened up the policy space for advocates of renewable energy to drive 
their own agenda? What are the co-benefits that have driven such sustainability policies? 
And finally, how have the political economy coalitions of stakeholders, both supporting and 
opposing sustainable energy policies, emerged to push their respective agendas?  
 
In order to grasp the dynamics of direct and indirect drivers impacting on the process of 
shifting priorities between climate change, security and cost to secure electricity generation, 
we have modified the original PEACH structural framework. Fundamentally, the PEACH 
structure makes it difficult to take account of the dynamic nature of power relations within the 
South African political economy landscape in the post-apartheid era. Between roughly 1994 
and 2014 it is possible to discern a distinct number of periods. Some of the key actors and 
institutions affecting the issue remain the same, but crucially for the analysis of the political 
economy drivers, some get marginalised, others emerge as more important players both in 
influencing changed policy and ensuring its implementation, and new coalitions bolstering the 
emergence of a renewable energy platform are formed. This has two consequences for this 
report’s analytic and presentation structure.  
 
Firstly, the ‘narrative section’ performs a crucial analytic function, allowing these shifting 
dynamics to be presented in the different periods identified as being structurally important. In 
this section, even where we agree on matters of descriptive narrative, we have differentiated 
our analysis from other discussions in the literature, not only in terms of content but also in 
terms of the utilisation of analytic variables. Previous analyses of the dynamics of the South 
African electricity/renewable energy, which we rest on in many respects, have not utilised 
three crucial analytic variables: the importance of periodisation, the manner in which value 
chains exercise power, and the role of coalitions in bringing about change.  
 
Secondly, in terms of presentation we have found it difficult to transform such shifting 
relationships of priority, power, and influence into the PEACH methodology’s stylised 
diagrammatic representations for the entire post-apartheid era. Hence we have created 
diagrammatic representations only for the latest period when renewable energy sources 
have realistically appeared as viable options with their own sustainable dynamic.  
 
The structure of the report is as follows: 
 
Methodological issues are dealt with in Section 2. Section 3 lays out a concise inventory of 
the policy frameworks that relate to the renewable energy sector and issues of climate 
change mitigation. (These policies are dealt with in more detail in dynamic form in the 
political economy analysis that follows in later sections.) Section 4 outlines an inventory of 
stakeholders, identifying the key actors and institutions exercising power and influencing 
policy. The stakeholder inventory also contains explanatory information on each of the 
various actors and institutions providing a static picture of how they fit into the overall political 
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economy mosaic. We relate these stakeholders to their various priority objectives, mapping 
those that are directly concerned with climate change mitigation and those that have other 
more indirect priority aims. The sections identifying stakeholders and their priorities are static 
representations of power and influence. Hence the importance of Section 5, which focuses 
on periodising the analytic narrative and so provides a dynamic element to the analysis. We 
situate the various stakeholders in the shifting flux of policy change during the past 20 years 
and provide a historical contextualisation to the current situation. Section 6 discusses four 
key challenges which have the potential to destabilise the current renewable energy initiative 
and produce a variety of differing outcomes. Finally, Section 7 deals with coalitions of 
change, specifically in the current period, and also acts as a conclusion. It identifies which 
stakeholders, actors and institutions have managed to come together in a coalition driving 
renewable energy, the basis for the major shift in policy, and examines the strength of its 
influence. Section 7 therefore pulls together the analysis and provides the answer to the 
central question posed, as well as assessing the potential obstacles and constraints that 
threaten this dynamic.  
14 
 
2 Existing and new conceptual frameworks 
 
This report is based on a desktop review of existing literature and on interviews with a 
number of key informants comprising specialist experts or stakeholder representatives.2 On 
this basis we have set out a review of the existing state of the literature, identified spaces for 
adding knowledge, and then developed a new methodology to enhance and augment the 
state of our knowledge. The first subsection describes the existing literature that has 
contributed to our understanding of the key issues surrounding renewable energy policy in 
South Africa – in other words, what is known. This followed by an identification of the gaps 
and opportunities for additional research. Finally, the last two subsections set out 
methodological and conceptual innovations to analyse the political economy of the 
renewable energy dynamics at play. The PEACH methodology applied on other studies is 
first set out, followed by a discussion that develops and augments its explanatory power. 
2.1  What is known 
There is an extensive literature concerned with South Africa’s energy and renewable energy 
sectors. There is significant controversy surrounding the topic – the newspaper headlines, 
the secrecy, the intrinsically political nature of energy production and consumption – but we 
have focused here on ideas existing in the public, published arena. Hence we have drawn 
from existing literature that can be clustered into three general areas of analysis:  
 
1. Technical, descriptive analysis of the energy and renewable energy sectors, providing 
insight into the current state of South Africa’s energy mix, the sector’s associated 
stakeholders and policies, as well as the evolution of the energy landscape over the 
past two decades.  
2. Political economy analysis of South Africa’s renewable energy programmes and 
stakeholders, from which we draw key insights to build upon in our own analysis. A 
fuller introduction of these policies and players is given in Section 4. 
3. Focused political economy analysis, specifically surrounding the local content 
requirements of the current renewable energy programme (RE IPPPP), which we 
draw upon to gain insight into the role that municipalities and local communities play 
both as electricity consumers and recipients of the programme’s potential economic 
benefits.  
2.1.1 Technical literature 
Our analysis required a foundation built upon technical and descriptive literature surrounding 
South Africa’s past, current, and future energy mix; the relevant policies that have shaped 
that energy mix; the roles and responsibilities of different actors within the system; and 
details of the design and implementation of the renewable energy policies (first REFIT and 
then RE IPPPP). To build a solid foundation, we drew from the plethora of descriptive 
literature, primarily emanating from the Energy Research Centre (ERC) domiciled in the 
University of Cape Town. The ERC and associated staff members are a key resource, 
producing reliable information surrounding South Africa’s energy sector, while linking energy 
policies and implementation to related themes, including economic and development issues, 
the environment and climate change. In this study, we draw primarily from Winkler (2005, 
2006, 2009); Winkler and Marquard (2007, 2009); Winkler et al. (2011); Marquard (2006); 
Trollip and Marquard (2010); Tyler and Winkler (2009); and Edkins, Marquard and Winkler 
(2010), as well as various official ERC commentaries on draft energy and climate change 
policies, including the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) and the Carbon Tax Policy. We also 
                                                        
2 A list of those interviewed is contained in Annex 1. 
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utilise the comprehensive GIZ3 report, Renewable Energy Policy Mapping Study of the 
Republic of South Africa, published in 2013, for the descriptive elements of this study 
regarding relevant policies and stakeholders (detailed in Sections 3 and 4). Moreover, Anton 
Eberhard’s work (2005, 2007, 2011; Eberhard et al. 2014), by far the most advanced 
analysis, has been an invaluable resource, providing information regarding the design of the 
REFIT and RE IPPPP policies, as well as the latter’s subsequent implementation, often 
bridging the gap between technical analysis and political economy implications.  
2.1.2 Political economy literature   
There are several recent studies that explore the political economy surrounding South 
African renewable energy policymaking and implementation. Pegels (2014), Eberhard, 
Kolker and Leighland (2014), Eberhard (2005, 2007, 2011), Idasa (2010), Baker (2011), 
Baker, Newell and Phillips (2014), Kiratu (2010), Never (2012), Buscher (2009) and Burton 
(2011) are notable examples. In Section 5 (Periodisation of the analytic narrative), we draw 
extensively from their work. However, our own analysis starts from a different political 
economy foundation, covers a more up-to-date period, and is based on information gained 
from our key stakeholder interviews. Hence in subsequent sections we note points at which 
our analysis either affirms or disputes elements of their argument.  
 
These authors share a perception that using a political economy approach is useful in 
analysing the outcomes of energy policy in South Africa for its explicit focus on the power 
dynamics between various stakeholders. Baker (2011) suggests that a political economy 
approach is necessary in formulating an understanding of the future of the energy and 
climate change sector in South Africa. As such, a political economy approach that recognises 
what Buscher (2009) calls the ‘axes of the energy debate’ (energy inequality and energy 
sustainability) is essential. Power dynamics, vested interests and beneficiaries of governance 
mechanisms have played a large role in shaping the structural status quo (Baker 2011). 
However, these authors recognise that a series of converging forces are shifting these power 
dynamics, the result of which will dictate the future success or failure of climate change 
policies in the South African context (Baker et al. 2014).  
 
Much of the existing political economy literature grounds its analysis in Fine and Rustomjee’s 
(1996) notion of the minerals-energy complex (MEC) as a lens through which to view and 
analyse the recent formation of South Africa’s renewable energy policies. Fine and 
Rustomjee argue that the MEC sectors of mining (including coal, gold and other minerals, 
both ferrous and non-ferrous), as well as electricity generation, petrochemicals, and petrol, 
are at the heart of the South African economy, both historically and currently and, through a 
complex network of ‘productive linkages’, maintain and continue to reinforce one another 
(Fine and Rustomjee 1996). Electricity generation is dominated by coal, the extraction of 
which requires large amounts of cheap electricity, as does the production of non-ferrous 
metals through smelting or refining (Burton 2011). In this way, extractive industries require 
large inflows of low-cost energy, while energy production requires large quantities of 
extracted resources, thus forming a close and interdependent relationship between these 
sectors (Burton 2011; Baker 2011). This complex has resulted in a historical legacy of 
dependence on ESKOM, the state-owned energy utility (Pegels 2014). While such a deep 
dependence on the utility to provide low-cost energy was feasible in the 1980s due to an 
energy surplus (Eberhard et al. 2014), massive growth in electricity demand has seen a 
number of structural shifts in the way the utility operates. Baker (2011) suggests that this will 
challenge energy policy in the future and forge a more viable space for renewable energy. 
Burton (2011) argues that the reliance on coal to provide relatively cheap electricity is central 
to the South African economy and will continue to have significantly negative effects on 
climate change mitigation policies. While industrial policy has supported MEC-dominance 
                                                        
3  GIZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – German development agency. 
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pre- and post-apartheid, this does not necessarily mean that industrial policy is 
unchangeable (Burton 2011). 
 
A number of forces are now in the process of converging with large positive effects on 
climate change policies (Baker et al. 2014). This process has not been orderly, with a 
number of unexpected changes along the way (Baker 2011). For much of this period, in 
which renewable energy feed-in tariffs seemed to be the future of the sector, independent 
power producers were frustrated by the absence of clear selection criteria in the face of large 
capital expenditure required to partake in the process (Baker 2011). At the time of writing, 
Kiratu (2010) saw the introduction of the Independent Power Purchaser Regulations by the 
Department of Energy (DoE) as contradictory to the REFIT system, indicating the confusion 
present at the time. While the process seemed to be stalling and extremely unclear towards 
the end of the late 2000s (Burton 2011), there has now been a strong movement towards the 
inclusion of the private sector in renewable energy generation (Never 2012). A number of 
authors have investigated how this change has come about given the historical dominance of 
stakeholders such as ESKOM who stalled such developments in the past (Burton 2011).  
 
Never (2012) suggests that ‘communities of practice’ have been an important feature of the 
success of climate change policies in South Africa, noting that these informal networks are 
bound by the exchange of information as well as a sense of commonality. Such networks 
have been important in changing the dominant political mindset of others in the energy policy 
space and their collective learning has been an essential feature of the success of the 
climate change policy in recent years (ibid.). Communities of practice that were pro-
renewables were established in the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), while 
communities of practice which opposed such developments were driven by the two largest 
greenhouse gas-emitting state-owned companies: the monopolistic electricity corporation, 
ESKOM, and the synthetic fuel-from-coal corporation, SASOL (Never 2012). While Never 
suggests that the relations within the DEA are ‘very personal, friendly or close’, suggesting a 
strong community of practice, the DEA is acknowledged as only having limited power as 
compared to other ministries (ibid.).  
 
Pegels (2014) mirrors the suggestion that groups of individuals have been key features of the 
success of shaping renewable energy in South Africa. Groups have formed in the central 
government, industry as well as in non-governmental, civil society. In central government, the 
DoE, the national electricity regulatory body (NERSA) as well as National Treasury and the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) have been strong institutional groups in the energy 
sector, while the Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG) as well as ESKOM have been key 
industry players. Both these industry players have had significant vested interests in 
maintaining the status quo (coal-based energy) and have strong links to policy. Non-
governmental organisations and civil society have only an indirect influence on energy policy 
(ibid.).  
 
While ESKOM faces the dilemma of needing to augment the already stretched energy supply 
in South Africa, Pegels (2014) suggests that ESKOM is apprehensive of the increased 
competition that this will bring to their energy generation. Key in quieting such concerns is 
the fact that energy planning has explicitly noted the dominance of coal for many years to 
come. This has been sufficient to assure ESKOM of their dominance as the main electricity 
supplier in the economy, and has opened a space for other groups to push the renewables 
agenda forward (ibid.).  
 
The most recent comprehensive political economy analysis is that of Anton Eberhard, which 
has been published concurrent with our own study. He stresses that RE IPPPP was different 
to REFIT in that the DoE took control of the programme rather than ESKOM or NERSA 
(Eberhard et al. 2014). The National Treasury has been central to this process through the 
formation of the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Unit which has managed the process and 
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has acted as a facilitator for the RE IPPPP process (op.cit.). This was possible because of 
the split in the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) into separate departments for 
energy and minerals. Before this split, and the subsequent ownership of policy on behalf of 
the DoE, it was not always clear where policy was made, even within government 
departments (Idasa 2010). The PPP unit, comprised of a small number of highly qualified 
individuals with senior experience working with both government and the private sector, was 
able to function effectively and with relative independence from government forces, which 
may have had an interest in preventing the development of renewable energy in South Africa 
(Eberhard et al. 2014). Being well capacitated also played a role in the unit’s success, since 
it was able to rely on a variety of private advisory assistance as well as a diversity of funds. 
Lastly, Eberhard et al. suggest that local content requirements were an important tool for the 
unit to utilise in gaining the support of labour organisations (ibid.). 
2.1.3 Focused political economy literature – local economic development  
Following the successful implementation of several bidding winners under RE IPPPP, new 
literature has emerged focusing particularly on the political economy implications of            
RE IPPPP’s local economic development objectives. Notable examples include Rennkamp 
and Westin (2013); Kaggwa et al. (2013); WTI Advisors (2013) and Wlokas, Boyd and 
Andolfi (2012). We draw on these studies in Section 6 (Challenges facing RE IPPPP and 
climate change policy) in order to acknowledge emerging areas of political economy 
research that will deserve further analysis as the local implications of South Africa’s growing 
renewable energy sector become more apparent with time. The following provides a brief 
summary of the key insights that stem from this line of research.  
 
Local content requirements (LCR) establish the way in which foreign investors allocate their 
resources. LCR have been used in South Africa to ensure a minimum level of local 
involvement in a project (Rennkamp and Westin 2013). While LCR encourage local 
economic development, Rennkamp and Westin (2013) describe them as a ‘balancing act’ 
due to the fact that setting requirements too high may deter investors through unnecessary 
price increases. In the recent RE IPPPP programme, LCR are as high as 45 per cent in 
some circumstances (ibid.). The authors suggest that LCR have not yet achieved their 
expected boost in a local production, especially in the high technology components of 
renewable energy production (ibid.). They attribute this to the fact that many uncertainties 
remain over LCR, with a lack of clear financial support for local manufacturing. Wlokas et al. 
(2012) suggest that it may be too soon to predict how the renewable energy market will 
actually affect socioeconomic development once projects are implemented and operational. 
The bidding process has also limited the entry of new, local firms into the renewables market 
through a minimum generation capacity requirement of 5MW (Rennkamp and Westin 2013).  
2.2  Opportunities for new analytic approaches  
The literature summarised in the previous pages provides opportunities for additional 
research and analysis. In this study, we therefore seek to add value to existing literature by 
taking advantage of the following opportunities.  
 
Research for the majority of the existing political economy studies cited in the previous 
section was conducted prior to the successful implementation of RE IPPPP. With the 
exception of Pegels (2014) and Eberhard et al. (2014), analysis of the process of RE IPPPP 
formulation was written during a time of immense confusion regarding the transition from 
REFIT to RE IPPPP, which negatively impacted the overall assessment of South Africa’s 
renewable energy prospects. Viewed from this context, the process of getting RE IPPPP off 
the ground appeared to be an incoherent and inefficient mess, offering little hope for 
success. Our research has taken place within a very different context – a true testament to 
the rapid pace of change occurring in South Africa’s renewable energy sector. The passing 
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of time has presented an opportunity to view the process of policymaking and 
implementation from a position of greater understanding and clarity.  
 
Moreover, the political economy literature with a focus on RE IPPPP’s local economic 
development implications has only recently produced key research findings. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this study to undertake an in-depth analysis of the local actors involved 
in RE IPPPP’s on-the-ground implementation, there is an opportunity to situate existing 
research within a larger political economy analysis, emphasising the role that local actors 
and municipalities currently play in the renewable energy sector and its associated policies. 
The progression of IPP project construction and operation in the near future will provide more 
information for further areas of research. In this study, we hope to highlight the significance 
of local stakeholders, the potential challenges and benefits that may arise from RE IPPPP’s 
local economic development component, and underscore the importance of expanding 
political economy analysis of this topic in the near future.  
 
Finally, much of the existing political economy literature utilises the concept of the minerals-
energy complex (MEC) as a departure point for analysis of South Africa’s current renewable 
energy policy landscape. We regard this as a limiting and inappropriate analytic foundation 
for understanding South Africa’s political economy and its historical process of economic 
accumulation.  
 
Whatever the historical judgment on the MEC may be in respect of the apartheid era, it does 
not adequately describe the relations of power operative in the contemporary post-apartheid 
phase. Unlike other African commodity producers, South Africa has singularly failed to take 
advantage of the post-millennium commodity boom. It is striking that phases of economic 
growth and slowdown in the post-apartheid era have been driven by processes not easily 
attributable to the MEC.  
 
Moreover, economic and industrial policy have been located in other political economy 
mechanisms than those specified as operative in the MEC conception. There is little 
evidence that the post-apartheid South African state is, or has been, driven by large mineral 
exporters. The mining companies have been in constant conflict with government over a 
variety of bills and charters, to the extent that further investment in this sector is severely 
constrained. In terms of industrial policy, economic diversification, through taxation of 
minerals, has been at the forefront of industrial policy initiatives to move away from a 
dependence on minerals towards manufacturing. 
 
Finally, in practical terms, rather than being able to exercise power to benefit themselves in a 
situation of electricity crisis, the large mineral and energy-intensive corporations which make 
up the Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG) have been the most supply-constrained in the 
electricity crisis. The electricity crunch hit has been focused on cutting back on electricity 
supply and directed mostly against the members of the EIUG.  
 
In essence, there is no evidence for this privileging of the MEC. If there is an integrated 
complex as described by the MEC, it does not appear to have anything like the power 
ascribed to it. This is not to say that the mining sector is without significant political influence, 
or that it does not attempt to influence energy policy, but the sector is not at the centre of 
political and economic power driving economic growth and class relations in South Africa and 
operating as a centralised and integrated MEC force. In summary, the MEC confuses 
interlinkages with expressions of political power and, as is apparent in our later analysis, we 
therefore do not regard it as a useful conceptual framework within which to understand the 
political economy dynamics driving the energy inter-relationships. For this reason we have 
adopted a different conceptual framework and methodology.  
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This study therefore analyses the events that have transpired over the past two decades 
utilising a new and innovative framework. The PEACH methodology, outlined in the following 
section, provides a unique method of mapping stakeholders and their respective objectives 
with regard to periods of transformative change. Moreover, we have chosen to add several 
components to the methodology to enhance our analysis, namely the customisation of the 
PEACH matrix to account for the unique dynamics of South Africa’s energy sector, the 
incorporation of a value chain framework, and the expansion and periodisation of the analytic 
narrative component of the PEACH methodology. These modifications and additions are 
described in detail in Section 2.3.  
2.3  PEACH methodology 
We have used the PEACH methodology (Schmitz 2012) but modified it in important ways as 
explained below. The PEACH methodology is concerned with answering the central question 
of the project: who drives/obstructs climate change policies? It invites complexity (of actors, 
institutions and motivations) and is based on identifying the various stakeholders involved, 
including their diverse priorities. It requires mapping these stakeholders in a power priority 
matrix according to their direct and indirect influence on policymaking and implementation, 
and analysing their competing narratives. The purpose of this distinction between different 
forms of influence is to identify stakeholders who exercise direct power to influence climate 
change through mitigation, as well as those actors who are highly relevant but whose 
involvement in the process is driven by other concerns – e.g. energy security, employment 
creation, poverty reduction, raising competitiveness. The PEACH methodology also 
emphasises the need to identify the level of influence that various stakeholders have in 
agenda setting and shifting implementation priorities in a variety of arenas.  
2.4 PEACH plus  
Although the PEACH methodology accepts that the ‘policy process has different stages’ 
(Schmitz 2012) it is silent on how to capture this without an extended analytic narrative 
encompassing these various stages, or periods as we prefer to call them. It is not clear how 
to marry ‘dynamic process’ with ‘static characterisation’. Hence we have followed this 
methodology to analyse influence and power but have not been able to do justice to the 
shifting complexity of these relations in a stylised diagram of influence and power as we 
move from one period to another. The flux and flow of influence, power and coalitions are 
hence dealt with in detail in what we have termed an analytic narrative periodising the 
political economy dynamics within the different stages identified. 
 
The PEACH methodology matrix has therefore been modified in three ways:  
 
First, the methodological matrix has been customised in order to take account of the 
specificity of South Africa’s energy political economy dimensions (Table 2.1 below). In South 
Africa (as in most of the rest of Africa) conventional energy supply is highly centralised and 
regulated. ESKOM is a publicly owned enterprise (parastatal) responsible for generation and 
transmission (and a fair amount of distribution) of electricity. Its pricing structure and general 
operations are regulated by a government-appointed but independently operated agency, the 
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA), subject to immense pressure from 
government ministries and ESKOM. Hence they have their own columns. Local government 
primarily refers to municipal/metropolitan government, rather than provincial government. 
Local government is structurally caught in a contradictory position. It is tasked with 
implementing government energy policy through its distribution agencies, but its primary 
concern is using electricity distribution to consumers and business as an important and major 
means of generating revenue to fund its overall budgetary requirements.  
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Second, this modified PEACH matrix has been inserted within the South African electricity 
value chain comprising the main linkages of raw material inputs, generation, transmission, 
distribution and consumption (Figure 2.1 below). The utilisation of a value chain methodology 
enables the political economy analysis to establish the drivers of the chain, the constraints 
operating at different links, and the struggles between different actors within the chain. What 
is clear from this diagrammatic representation is that the state-owned enterprise (ESKOM) is 
present at all value chain levels and acts as a key driver, facilitating and/or constraining 
policy formulation and implementation. Furthermore, there are a number of government 
departments and agencies involved in the value chain that are either working in accord or in 
conflict at any particular period. 
 
Third, we have represented these various struggles within a structural periodisation so as to 
introduce historical dynamism into the analysis. The political economy dynamics and 
struggles between the various stakeholders (actors, interest groups and institutions) have 
shifted and changed during different periods. Much of this is attributable to different 
stakeholders expressing their vested interests or through mobilising coalitions of power. 
However, history is not the simple playing out of predetermined relations of power. Political 
economy analysis also has to take into account unintended consequences which surprise all 
and sundry, and create the necessary contingency to understand the dynamic flux of 
historical change. These unintended consequences, albeit driven by other motives and 
actions, open up alternative spaces and create opportunities which different stakeholders are 
able to take advantage of and change what previously appeared to be fixed trajectories of 
development. Since they are driven by other factors, interests and processes, they can also 
have the unintended consequence of closing down space and constraining the dynamic of 
existing trajectories. In the analysis that follows we identify at least three such moments of 
unintended consequence that have had a critical and positive impact in changing the 
purpose and outcome of the renewable energy trajectory in different periods. Hence, 
methodologically speaking, the periodisation of this story is essential in order to illustrate the 
fluctuations in power dynamics that give rise to shifts in decision-making and, ultimately, 
policy formation. In policy terms, what appeared to be constraints have become challenges, 
and what emerged as new opportunities have become threats from one period to the next.   
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Table 2.1   Political economy dimensions  
 
Main 
stakeholders 
National 
government 
departments; 
presidency 
Regulatory 
agencies1 
Parastatals2 
Local 
government3 
Business groups 
Civil society 
organisations4 
Policy arenas 
Global and 
national 
National National Local5 National Subnational 
Priorities 
Various: energy 
security; cost; 
generation; jobs; 
economic growth 
Regulation 
Reliable supply;  
market control 
Revenue 
generation 
Increase 
competitiveness 
Low-cost domestic 
electricity; 
climate change; 
reliable supply  
Stages of the 
policy 
process 
Formulation Regulation 
 
Formulation, 
lobbying, 
implementation 
 
Adoption, 
implementation6  
Formulation, 
lobbying and 
implementation7 
Monitoring and 
policy influence 
Notes: 
1 Regulatory agencies – NERSA.  
2 Public/state-owned enterprises – ESKOM. 
3 Local government includes municipalities, metropolitan councils, and provincial government. 
4 This covers non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (such as Earthlife Africa focused on monitoring, WWF on policy influence), labour unions, domestic household groupings concerned with the 
price of electricity, university research units and academics, and private consulting companies (such as OneWorld focused on policy evidence and influence). 
5 We prefer to use ‘local’ rather than ‘regional’ since in sub-Saharan Africa regional means a sub-region of countries. 
6 Provincial and metropolitan local governments try to operate at a policy level but they are constrained by policy centralisation. 
7 Big business involved in lobbying for reliable and cheaper energy; Independent Power Producers (IPPs) for implementation of renewable energy. 
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Figure 2.1 South Africa’s electricity value chain  
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3 Inventory of South Africa’s relevant climate 
change policies 
 
The following section briefly describes relevant South African climate change and energy 
policies, an overview intended to give the reader a general understanding of the progression 
of climate change change-related policymaking in South Africa. The policies are listed in 
chronological order of their publication. It is important to note that these are just policies. 
Actual implementation – as can be witnessed below in the lack of progress made by the 
Carbon Tax and Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) Bill – is not a given, but is 
determined by the dynamic interactions and negotiations that take place between a multitude 
of actors, each with their respective objectives, levels of power, and vulnerabilities to external 
and internal influence. Furthermore, these complex relationships exist within particular 
historical contexts: timing is a key element in the South African story of climate change policy 
implementation. With the limitations of this inventory in mind, the periodised analytic narrative 
in Section 6 intends to provide context and nuance to this inventory, exploring the complex 
dynamics behind policymaking and policy implementation, and the relationship between 
these two processes.  
3.1 The White Paper on Energy Policy 1998 
The White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa, published in 
December 1998, was drafted during the first phase of the National Electrification Programme, 
an accelerated rolling out of electricity to black South Africans in underdeveloped urban and 
rural areas implemented between 1994 and 1999. The document set out to define energy 
objectives in post-apartheid South Africa, primarily focused on universal access to electricity, 
improvement in energy governance structures, the introduction of competition into the energy 
market, and diversification of energy supply sources (DME 1998).  
 
The main outcome of the document was a political mandate for the unbundling of electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution. The focus of the paper was introducing 
competition into the energy sector, particularly through the involvement of the private sector, 
with emphasis on the importance of allowing energy consumers the right to choose their 
electricity provider (DME 1998). To accomplish this goal, the document authorised up to 30 
per cent of South Africa’s generation to be sourced from independent power producers 
(IPPs). Significantly, specific technologies for the entrance of IPPs into the energy market 
were not defined. However, at the time of its publication – a period during which it was clear 
that new capacity was required immediately – the intention was that these IPPs would be 
utilised for building and connecting new coal-fired power stations to the grid, with little 
intention for renewable energy generation.4  
3.2 Renewable Energy Policy White Paper 2003 
The White Paper on Energy Policy spurred a debate surrounding ESKOM’s restructuring and 
the future role of the private sector in contributing and diversifying South Africa’s energy 
generation (detailed in Section 6.2). Within the midst of this debate, government began 
developing its renewable energy policy. In 2003, the White Paper on Renewable Energy 
(REWP) was published, setting a target of 10,000GWh of renewable energy by 2013 and 
committing the government to develop a strategic framework and mechanisms to achieve 
that goal.  
 
                                                        
4 Interview, Hilton Trollip (independent expert). 
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At the time, REWP generated a great deal of confusion surrounding what the 10,000GWh 
actually meant. REWP failed to specify whether it was a cumulative or annual target and 
whether the target was limited to electricity or would include other renewable energy 
services. The DoE later clarified that the 10,000GWh target would be met by bagasse        
(59 per cent), landfill gas (6 per cent), small scale hydro (10 per cent), solar water heaters 
(13 per cent), biomass (1 per cent), and wind (1 per cent); curiously no photovoltaic (PV) or 
concentrated solar power (CSP) was included in the target (Eberhard et al. 2014). Due to 
delays in the actual implementation of the policy (discussed at length in Section 6), the target 
of 10,000GWh was not met by 2013.  
3.3 Integrated Energy Plan 2003 
The first Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) was published in 2003 by the Department of Minerals 
and Energy. The IEP provided guidelines for energy policy decision making, analysing 
different trajectories of the South African economy up to 2020 while taking into account future 
generation capacity, reserves, energy consumption, possible energy mixes, and the 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of those possible energy sources (Winkler 2006). The IEP 
is meant to align with all national development plans and strategies, international 
commitments, and long-term climate change mitigation strategies.  
 
Policy later dictated by the National Energy Act of 2008 requires that an IEP be formulated 
on an annual basis and report on all energy consumption and energy generation for the next 
20-year period. In reality, this has not been the case. The second IEP report was drafted in 
2012 by the DoE, became open for public comment in 2013, and scheduled for submission 
to the Cabinet by the end of 2014. The finalisation of the IEP is significant, not only in 
charting the future trajectory of South Africa’s energy mix, but in laying the technical 
foundation for the official revision of the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP).  
3.4 Electricity Regulation Act 2006 
Developed by the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), the Electricity Regulation Act 
(ERA) established a framework for electricity regulation in South Africa. The key outcome of 
the act was the establishment of NERSA, replacing the National Energy Regulator (NER) as 
the regulatory body mandated with the protection and enforcement of the national electricity 
policy framework. It stipulates that NERSA must act within the guidelines of the IRP. The 
regulator is the ultimate entity that determines electricity tariffs; grants licences for the 
generation, distribution and transmission of electricity; and controls the import and export of 
electricity. The ERA also clarified NERSA’s relationship with ESKOM, stipulating that 
ESKOM is the sole purchaser of generated electricity in South Africa.  
 
The ERA had major implications for future IPP programmes and the subsequent 
development of the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) and RE IPPPP. Through 
establishing clear, separate mandates for both NERSA and ESKOM and defining their 
relationship with each other, the ERA provided the regulator with some independence from 
ESKOM, but essentially created a policy implementation gridlock. The DME (later 
Department of Energy) remained charged with setting energy policy, NERSA was charged 
with licensing power for new generation activities, and ESKOM was charged with the 
purchasing of any new generation. In effect, this arrangement meant that all three bodies had 
to align in agreement with the allocation of new generation capacity in order for IPPs to be 
connected to the national grid. Consequently, it allowed ESKOM, as sole purchaser, to delay 
the process of bringing private sector generation on board (as is further discussed in       
Section 6.3). 
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3.5 Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios paper 2007  
The Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios paper (LTMS) signifies a significant step in South 
Africa’s climate change policymaking and played a surprisingly large role in advancing the 
country’s renewable energy programme. The paper was commissioned by the DEA for the 
purpose of assessing South Africa’s GHG emissions mitigation scenarios. The research-
based scenario-mapping process was conducted by a multi-stakeholder team, which 
included representatives from government, the private sector and civil society.  
 
The scenario mapping resulted in a peak-plateau-decline emissions strategy for South Africa 
(Figure 3.1). The strategy proposed the following trajectory (DEA 2007):  
 
 The start of the plateau: GHG emissions stop growing at 550MT CO2  by 2020–25 
 The end of the plateau: GHG emissions begin declining in 2030–35 
 The resulting base level: GHG emissions reduce to levels required by international 
standards by 2050–60. 
 
Additionally, LTMS strategies have been developed or are in the process of being developed 
for the following sectors: energy, industry, waste management, agriculture, construction, and 
mining (GIZ 2013).  
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Figure 3.1 South Africa’s greenhouse gas emission reductions and limits 
Source: Adapted from DEA (2009).  
 
The LTMS has had a significant effect in shaping energy policy in South Africa. Firstly, the 
DEA’s publication of the LTMS informed President Zuma’s pledge at the Copenhagen 
Conference of Parties (COP) in 2009 to reduce GHG emissions by 34 per cent from business 
as usual by 2020 – an event that was surprising due to the fact that South Africa, as a non-
Annex 1 country under the Kyoto Protocol, was not required to implement caps on GHG 
emissions (this event is described further in Section 6.4) (Eberhard et al. 2014). Secondly, 
the LTMS served as the basis for future energy mix planning, informing both the IRP in 2010 
and the National Climate Change Response White Paper in 2011. 
3.6 New Generation Regulations 2009, and Electricity 
Regulation Bill 2011 
The Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity was published under the 2006 
Electricity Regulations Act in 2009 with the objective of establishing a policy mandate for the 
implementation of the REFIT programme, effectively allowing IPPs to participate in national 
electricity generation. The New Generation Regulations outlined the process for regulating 
the creation of IPP power purchase agreements for all generation technologies, including 
renewables and cogeneration. Furthermore, it created the basis for establishing electricity 
tariffs for IPPs that both encouraged participation by ensuring an appropriate return and that 
were cost reflective and transparent. Significantly, the regulations outlined the framework for 
designing and implementing an IPP bid programme.  
 
During the development of REFIT, the DoE initiated a process of revising the Regulations on 
New Generation with input from foreign consultants. The result was the Electricity Regulation 
Bill (Second Amendment), which came into effect in May 2011. The bill contained a number 
of changes to the original Regulations on New Generation Capacity that effectively 
transferred powers that used to reside within NERSA and ESKOM’s mandate to the DoE. 
NERSA’s power to formulate the power purchase agreement (PPA) and selection criteria 
was removed. The selection process of the REFIT IPPs was taken out of ESKOM’s control 
and the bill made it possible for the Minister of Energy to instruct ESKOM to buy power from 
an IPP.  
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In effect the bill placed the development of an IPP programme under the control of the DoE 
and laid the framework for regulating the RE IPPPP, the implementation of which was not 
previously supported by any existing policy.  
3.7 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2010, and the IRP Update 
Report 2013 
The IRP is intended to be a ‘living document’, informed by the IEP and the peak-plateau-
decline scenarios of the LTMS, to be revised and updated by the DoE at a minimum of every 
two years according to changing energy demand and supply in the country. The IRP 2010 
was approved in May 2011, establishing the country’s energy mix for the next 20 years. The 
plan added 56,539MW, which more than doubled capacity to 89,532MW by 2030, with new 
generation capacity sourced from various technologies. Coal remained the dominant source 
with 29 per cent (16,383MW) of the new capacity coming from this traditional source.5 
However, significant allocations for renewables marked a structural shift in the country’s 
energy planning: 16.3 per cent (9,200MW) for wind, 14.9 per cent (8,400MW) for photovoltaic 
solar (PV), and 2.1 per cent (1,200MW) for concentrated solar power (CSP). Of the total 
expected capacity in 2030, coal would still remain the dominant form of supply at 45.9 per 
cent, but renewables from wind, solar and CSP would make up 21 per cent of total capacity. 
The IRP was hailed as a much needed diversification away from coal-based electricity 
generation. The plan also made a major commitment to expand nuclear capacity in the 
additional energy mix: 9,600MW was to be added (16.3 per cent of the additional capacity) 
so that by 2030 nuclear would constitute 10 per cent of total electricity capacity (DoE 
2011a).6 
 
Along with the revision of the IEP, the IRP underwent an update in 2013 due to changes in 
the economic climate taking into account the recession following the financial crisis. The 
update resulted in markedly different energy demand forecasts than were previously made in 
2010. The changes made in the Update Report not only reflected a more accurate 
calculation of South Africa’s energy demand trajectory, but they marked a transition from a 
single plan with predesignated allocations for different generation technologies to a scenario-
based plan. Under this new dynamic plan, future generation options, like nuclear and CSP, 
are to be weighed against electricity demand, cost, and progress made on alternative 
generation technologies. For example, the Update Report delays decision-making on nuclear 
power generation until 2015. At that time, the government can only proceed with nuclear 
power development if electricity demand exceeds 270TWh, there is no shale gas 
development, and nuclear generation costs are under US$6,500/kWh (ERC 2013).7  
 
The contextualisation of energy policy decision-making in the Update Report represents a 
significant step towards transforming the IRP into the living document it was intended to be. It 
also presents the possibility of incorporating the IRP Update Report into a revised White 
Paper (the revision process was initiated at the REWP’s midterm review in 2009) that reflects 
the country’s current energy supply and demand realities. However, the DoE has yet to 
publish the IRP Update Report as the new IRP iteration. According to a key expert 
interviewed, the DoE’s delay is most likely due to the ministry’s hesitation to place limitations 
on nuclear energy development given the considerable amount of support for nuclear 
development in government.8  
 
                                                        
5 GHG emissions will increase from 237 to 272 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide in 2030 (Winkler et al. 2011). 
6 The rationale for nuclear energy was not only stability of supply but also to meet the GHG mitigation goals. 
7www.ercblogs.co.za/2013/irp-update-is-makes-a-step-change-to-informed-decision-making/ (accessed 26 January 2015). 
8 Interview, Anton Eberhard (independent expert). 
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3.8 National Climate Change Response White Paper 2011 
The National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCR) was published in 2011, prior 
to South Africa’s hosting of COP17 in Durban. The paper gives a broad overview of the 
country’s climate change response framework and sets priorities for adaptation and 
mitigation strategies. It also expands the emissions caps included in the IRP, as informed by 
the peak-plateau-decline scenarios of the LTMS.  
3.9 Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) Bill  
The Independent System and Market Operator (ISMO) Bill’s original objective was to create 
an autonomous state-owned entity that would be charged with the development of 
generation and resource planning, the purchasing of power from electricity generators, the 
trading of electricity and overseeing systems operations (GIZ 2013). If created, the ISMO 
would also be in charge of the technical modelling inputs and development of the IRP.  
 
The motivation behind the ISMO Bill has been longstanding and growing. Currently, ESKOM 
plays the role of majority generator of electricity in South Africa (95 per cent) and sole 
procurer of electricity – acting as both the ‘player and the referee’ – a glaring conflict of 
interest (Baker 2011: 5). The Single Buyer Office (SBO) within ESKOM was intended to be a 
temporary arrangement until an ISMO could be established, buying electricity from the IPPs 
in the interim. However, given the multiple revisions of the ISMO Bill, which have essentially 
watered down its original mandate, and its lack of traction in Parliament (the Bill was 
presented before Parliament in 2013, only to be withdrawn from the parliamentary schedule), 
the establishment of an ISMO in the near future seems unlikely. Furthermore, even if an 
ISMO was established, it is equally unlikely that the independent operator would hold a 
mandate and level of influence strong enough to pose a credible counterweight to ESKOM.9  
3.10 Carbon Tax Policy Paper 
The National Treasury (NT) published the Carbon Tax Policy Paper for public comment in 
2013, following a discussion document published in 2010, and the subsequent inclusion of a 
carbon tax in the national budget reviews in 2012 and 2013. The policy paper recommends a 
carbon tax of R120 per ton of carbon equivalent above the determined threshold, to be 
increased by 10 per cent each year until 2020 (GIZ 2013: 60). Originally due to commence in 
2015, the tax’s introduction was delayed until 2016 by the NT in an announcement made at 
the beginning of 2014.10  
 
Like the ISMO Bill, the future discussions surrounding the implementation of the Carbon Tax 
Policy Paper will provide an interesting insight into the political economy dynamics involved 
in South Africa’s climate change decision-making. For the NT, the ministry behind the policy, 
the carbon tax is valuable in its own right, providing a source of additional revenue. However, 
the private sector has argued vehemently against the introduction of the tax, citing the 
current depressed economic environment and concerns over the effects on South Africa’s 
global competitiveness. Labour is equally concerned with the job losses that may occur if the 
tax negatively affects industrial turnover. The debate surrounding the policy is highly 
illustrative of the conflicts that exist between climate change policies and national 
development plans. Implementing climate change mitigation strategies must necessarily 
involve a complex negotiation between environmental, development, and job creation 
motivations in government. This negotiation, and the power dynamics that are implicit within 
the process, will most likely result in further delays, reductions, or, as one key expert 
interviewed predicted, a ‘death’ of the carbon tax in South Africa.11 
                                                        
9 Interview, Belynda Petrie (independent expert). 
10 www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2014/02/26/sas-carbon-tax-delayed-by-one-year-to-2016 (accessed 26 January 2015). 
11 Interview, Belynda Petrie (independent expert). 
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4 Inventory and analysis of relevant 
stakeholders 
 
The following section provides an inventory of the relevant stakeholders involved in South 
Africa’s climate change policies, focusing particularly on the creation and implementation of 
South Africa’s current renewable energy IPP programme (RE IPPPP). While there are many 
actors that played a role in the process (described in detail in Section 5), these stakeholders 
have been selected based on the role they have played and will continue to play in the 
unfolding of South Africa’s renewable energy programme – both as active participants in, and 
outcome beneficiaries of, the process. Table 4.1 introduces the relevant stakeholders and 
the domains in which they operate. Section 4.1 provides a description of each of the 
stakeholders – their mandates, functions, motivations, priorities and relative levels of 
influence within the system. Section 4.2 summarises these descriptions graphically, 
illustrating the stakeholders’ priorities and level of influence in relation to one another in order 
to provide a foundational visual guide to the detailed narrative that will follow in Section 5.  
Table 4.1 Inventory of stakeholders at multiple levels 
Stakeholder/arenas International National Local/provincial 
Government 
departments 
 
NT 
DoE 
DEA 
DPE 
DTI 
Presidency 
Provincial departments  
Local municipalities 
Government agencies  NERSA  
Parastatals  ESKOM  
Private sector 
EIUG 
IPPs 
EIUG 
IPPs 
 
 
 
Civil society 
 
NGOs 
Labour unions 
NGOs 
Research units 
Consulting firms 
Communities and 
householders 
4.1  Inventory of stakeholders  
4.1.1 Government departments and agencies  
 
Department of Energy (DoE) 
In South Africa, energy policy has historically been under the control of the Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME), one of the country’s oldest national departments. In 2009, newly 
elected President Zuma separated the two sectors into the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR) and the Department of Energy (DoE). A mandate for the DoE, separate from the 
interests of the mineral sector, was determined. The DoE is charged with ensuring secure 
and sustainable provision of energy for socioeconomic development in South Africa. The 
ministry is divided into four branches: policy, planning and clean energy; energy programmes 
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and projects; petroleum and petroleum products regulation; and nuclear energy – each with a 
deputy director general. For the purpose of this study, the policy, planning and clean energy 
branch is the most relevant actor within the ministry.  
 
The DoE’s mandate is complex, requiring a balancing act between ensuring enough supply 
for energy demand, maintaining the low prices that industrial and household users are 
accustomed to in South Africa, diversifying the energy mix as a matter of energy security, 
and adhering to the international and domestic commitments towards GHG emissions 
reductions and climate change mitigation efforts. Furthermore, energy production, provision 
and prices are inherently tied up with national priorities of economic growth and job creation. 
This is true of any country, but is especially significant given both the historical and current 
weight of the minerals and energy sectors in South Africa as discussed in Section 5.   
 
Over the past ten years the DoE (and previously the DME) has played vastly different roles in 
the story of climate change and energy policy in South Africa, varying in agendas, priorities, 
competencies, and in relative influence. This can mostly be attributed to the fact that the 
department has gone through multiple changes in ministers since 2004, each change in 
leadership accompanied by a different direction for the department.12 
 
Given the frequent changes of leadership in the DoE, the complex set of priorities the 
ministry faces, and the tendency of the ministers to influence the weighting of those priorities, 
the DoE has been marked by contradictory and incoherent actions over the years. This 
makes it difficult to pinpoint a discrete set of motivations and priorities driving the ministry. 
The DoE’s recent involvement in South Africa’s successful renewable energy IPP 
programme (RE IPPPP) further complicates the matter. However, as the narrative in Section 
5 describes in detail, the DoE’s involvement and subsequent leadership position in the 
programme was heavily driven by energy security concerns, spurred by the 2008 energy 
crisis. 
  
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA)  
The DEA is in charge of setting climate change policy in South Africa. The ministry is 
mandated with ensuring the adherence to environmental standards on pollution, ecological 
degradation, conservation and sustainable development. Within the realm of energy policy, 
the DEA is charged with promoting clean energy and efficient energy use in South Africa. 
More than any of the other relevant government stakeholders, the DEA’s priorities are in line 
with international climate change objectives.  
 
The DEA’s level of influence relative to the National Treasury and DoE is significantly less 
due to the fact that its mandate is not tied up with the immediate national priorities of 
economic growth and job creation. This is an unfortunate reality given the centrality of 
environmental and climate change impacts in long-term economic growth. However, there 
are signs that this short-term mindset is slowly transforming within government. The LTMS, 
published by the DEA in 2007, greatly influenced the voluntary targets President Zuma set at 
the Copenhagen Accords for South Africa’s emission reductions. Although this decision itself 
was not motivated principally by climate change concerns, rather being politically driven by 
the desire for international recognition of South Africa as a leader in emerging economy 
climate change efforts,13 the results that followed were significant and ultimately led to the 
development of an informed IRP and the implementation of RE IPPPP.  
 
While the analytical narrative in Section 5 will highlight the fact that climate change is not the 
main driver for a green transformation in South Africa, the DEA is still able to exercise some 
influence, albeit minor. This is mostly due to South Africa’s current positioning in the 
                                                        
12 Interview, Hilton Trollip (independent expert). 
13 Interview, Belynda Petrie (independent expert). 
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international context. As one of the emerging BRICS14 economies and as a leader in the 
African continent, South Africa receives and encourages attention from the global stage with 
regard to its progressive policies. This is especially true with regard to climate change, as 
South Africa seeks to become a regional leader and a BRICS leader in climate change policy 
in the public sphere.15  
 
Given this motivating force, regardless of how serious the country’s commitments may be in 
reality, the DEA does have growing international pressure for climate change mitigation on its 
side. As the analytic narrative illustrates, this pressure has served to catalyse action in the 
past and may lead to a further elevation of the ministry’s relative influence regarding energy 
decision-making in the future.  
 
National Treasury (NT) 
The mandate of the National Treasury is to manage national government spending. With 
regard to energy-related activities, the NT approves all budgets from government 
departments (DoE, DEA, DPE, etc), is responsible for the oversight of state-owned 
enterprise finances (e.g. ESKOM), and administers energy-related subsidies, incentives, and 
taxes (GIZ 2013: 36).  
 
Given the broad nature of the NT’s mandate and the expanse of its responsibilities across all 
departments, it is not surprising that the Treasury played such an integral role in the success 
of South Africa’s renewable energy programme. The decision to support the formulation and 
implementation of RE IPPPP evolved from a number of highly contextualised motives, the 
most pressing of which was the security of energy supply after the 2008 energy crisis. Yet, 
the decision can equally be attributed to the personal motives and high level of commitment 
of leadership within the NT and key staff within its Public–Private Partnership Unit.  
 
Because the NT coordinates government finances, it has the highest level of influence 
among the governmental stakeholders described in this section. Furthermore, the 
government employees within the Treasury are generally regarded as highly skilled, qualified 
and competent. This level of capacity, paired with the ability to make funding decisions, 
ensures that NT-backed projects are accompanied by a high level of political and 
bureaucratic support. It was within this context that the NT was able to provide the strong 
foundation of political buy-in necessary for the success of the RE IPPPP programme.  
 
Department of Public Enterprises (DPE)  
The DPE, as the ministry charged with the oversight responsibility of South Africa’s state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), is the sole shareholder of ESKOM. The events presented in the 
following narrative strongly suggest that the DPE has little independence from ESKOM with 
regard to energy policy priorities and mostly backs the utility’s decision-making processes.  
 
Interviews conducted with a number of key experts indicate that the main priority of the DPE 
is to preserve ESKOM’s monopoly over the entire energy value chain, thus maintaining the 
ministry’s status of owning one of the biggest companies in South Africa.16 Interviewees 
regarded the ministry as ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’ with low operating capacity.17 Unsurprisingly, 
the DPE, as the ministry charged with overseeing public enterprises, is a stalwart for public 
sector-led economic development, and hence maintaining ESKOM’s controlling presence 
throughout the value chain. The ministry’s stance is indicative of a larger ideological conflict 
within government, and South African society as a whole, contrasting the role of the 
developmental state and that of the private sector in achieving national development 
                                                        
14 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – grouped together as emerging economies. 
15 Interview, Jon Kornik (independent expert, IPP investment). 
16 For example, interview, Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
17 Interviews, Belynda Petrie, Anton Eberhard, Hilton Trollip (independent experts). 
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objectives. This ideological debate can be seen throughout the unfolding of South Africa’s 
formation and implementation of renewable energy policies.  
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
The Department of Trade and Industry’s mandate is generally focused around the inclusive 
and equitable economic development of South Africa. This mandate includes the priorities of 
building global competitiveness in industry, diversifying industrial activities, creating an 
environment conducive to foreign investment, increasing local ownership in industry, and, 
finally, creating employment opportunities.  
 
While the DTI played a minor role in the actual formulation of RE IPPPP, the department 
played an important role in building the coalition necessary to implement the programme. Job 
creation, industrial diversification, and local participation in renewable energies had to be a 
key aspect of the programme in order to gain widespread support within not only 
government, but the consumer base as a whole. These factors are integrated directly into the 
RE IPPPP selection criteria. Project developers have to demonstrate minimum levels 
(subject to increase for each subsequent bidding round) of job creation, local content, local 
ownership, local enterprise development, and socioeconomic development projects targeted 
towards the communities that are directly impacted by the construction of wind and solar 
infrastructure. Points are awarded to the project developers based on the relative levels of 
impact their economic development plans will make above and beyond the minimum 
threshold levels.  
 
Gaining DTI support was an important component of the political buy-in process to ensure a 
green light from government for the process to continue. However, continued support of the 
DTI is contingent upon whether or not the local economic development components (Box 5.4 
in Section 5.4.4) will deliver on their promised results. The potential challenges facing the 
implementation of these development objectives are discussed at length in Section 6.3.  
 
The Presidency  
The office of the president has had a complex and contradictory position with regard to 
renewable energy and conventional coal-based electricity supply. On the one hand, 
especially under Zuma’s Presidency, it has been conspicuously absent in providing the 
necessary political will and direction for driving an alternative renewable strategy. On the 
other hand, during 2014, Zuma’s influence has been evident behind the scenes in altering 
the political economy dynamics in three conspicuous ways: firstly, in prioritising nuclear 
energy options, and supporting secret negotiations, especially with the Russian government, 
around investment to build nuclear power stations; secondly, in shuffling his cabinet in his 
second term to place a new minister at the head of the DoE who is more compliant in 
supporting nuclear electricity generation; and thirdly, in creating a new coalition between the 
Presidency and the DoE focused on signing nuclear power agreements with certain foreign 
governments, the Russians in particular. What lies behind this presidential intervention is 
somewhat opaque but, as documented above, there are numerous public and private 
speculations and allegations of individual and political party benefit from such deals.   
 
Local government  
Municipalities play a key role in the distribution of electricity, supplying 40 per cent of total 
electricity sold to 60 per cent of ESKOM’s customer base. ESKOM directly supplies 60 per 
cent of electricity volumes to 40 per cent of the total customer base (GIZ 2013). Most of 
these municipalities consistently struggle with securing the revenue necessary to fund the 
services and development objectives articulated in South Africa’s National Development Plan 
and New Growth Path (ibid.).  
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Figure 4.1 illustrates that the revenue gained from property taxes and other sources of 
municipal income has remained static over the years, while reliance on service charges and 
national grants and subsidies has steadily increased from 2009 to 2012. Electricity service 
charges have become a main source of income for municipalities (60 per cent), with mark-
ups ranging from 20 per cent to 150 per cent (GIZ 2013). Electricity tariff increases across 
the board, as dictated by NERSA, have created a negative backlash from industries and 
households in response to the municipality mark-ups, which significantly exacerbate the 
burden of rising electricity costs (see Kaplan, Morris and Martin 2014 for a discussion of 
municipal electricity mark-ups in the Eastern Cape Province). 
Figure 4.1 Municipal income by type 
Source: Adapted from GIZ (2013). 
 
Municipality support for renewable energies is limited. Their main priority is to limit further 
increases in electricity tariffs in order to maintain the mark-ups necessary to continue their 
operations without further irritating their residents. If they view the entrance of renewable 
energies as a tax on the consumer, raising tariffs even further as ESKOM is forced to expand 
its distribution network to accommodate IPPs, then it is not in their interest to support such a 
programme. Ultimately, their influence within the system is minimal – they are subject to buy 
the electricity that ESKOM supplies at the rates that NERSA determines – and they play little 
role within the realm of renewable energy decision-making.  
 
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) 
NERSA is South Africa’s electricity regulator, ultimately responsible for determining electricity 
tariffs; granting licences for electricity generation and overseeing its distribution and 
transmission; and controlling electricity import and export. In addition to these functions, the 
Energy Regulation Act defined NERSA’s mandate as the protector and enforcer of the 
national electricity policy framework. It stipulated that NERSA is to act within the guidelines of 
the forthcoming IRP 2010, and all subsequent national energy policies.  
 
NERSA’s role as the enforcer of national policy has led to misinterpretations as to its role and 
motivations in policymaking and implementation, especially with respect to its involvement in 
renewable energy policy. Due to NERSA’s initial leadership in the development of South 
Africa’s renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFIT), NERSA has often been misconstrued as a 
proactive, interventionist body, pushing a renewable energy agenda (Baker et al. 2014). 
While it is the case that NERSA is an independent body that often acts in opposition to 
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ESKOM’s wishes (e.g. NERSA’s refusal to grant the full amount of ESKOM’s tariff increase 
applications), NERSA is fundamentally a reactive body of government, giving it very little 
power and influence over actual energy sector interventions.18  
 
NERSA’s main role and primary motivation is the regulation of energy prices. In this respect, 
like government, it is caught between two conflicting sets of demands. On the one hand there 
is serious pressure on the body from government, industry, and household consumers to 
maintain low prices. On the other, ESKOM has been pushing for radical and steep price 
increases to fund its capital finance programme and ensure energy security. NERSA’s 
priority is therefore to strike a balance between maintaining affordable prices, while still 
ensuring enough revenue for ESKOM to provide new generation capacity to secure future 
energy supply. This negotiation between two conflicting priorities makes it difficult to pinpoint 
NERSA’s main motivation at any point in time. NERSA’s recognition of IPPs as an efficient 
mechanism for quickly increasing electricity generation capacity as a means for securing 
energy supply and its acceptance of the ability of the IPPs through the competitive bidding 
process to drive renewable electricity unit prices downwards have ensured its latecomer 
support of the RE IPPPP programme.  
4.1.2 Business – public sector parastatals and private sector 
 
ESKOM  
ESKOM, South Africa’s vertically integrated state-owned energy utility, holds monopoly 
power over the electricity value chain linkages of generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electricity. The utility currently generates 95 per cent of the country’s electricity (as of 2012, 
the maximum generation capacity was 41,647MW), 85 per cent of which is generated by 
coal-fired power plants (Figure 4.2) (DoE 2014). New generation capacity from the 
construction of two new coal-fired power plants – Medupi and Kusile – will add an additional 
4,764MW and 4,800MW respectively (ESKOM 2011).  
 
ESKOM has monopoly control over access to and exit from the transmission backbone. 
ESKOM does not control the price of purchasing electricity from power suppliers as this is set 
externally, but it exercises crucial monopoly control over how access occurs. This involves a 
series of technical issues as power in the main transmission backbone is moved at high 
voltage while entry and exit occur at lower voltages. ESKOM controls entry to the 
transmission grid from electricity generation points (coal, nuclear power stations and 
renewable energy IPPs). In the case of power stations these are usually constructed close to 
coal mining sources and ESKOM has constructed access substations in the immediate 
vicinity. Theoretically, once IPPs win their competitive bid they have access to the 
transmission grid. However, an IPP may not be geographically close to a substation and this 
complicates issues for ESKOM, since it either requires building a substation access point or 
making alternative technical arrangements. Although ESKOM therefore has technical 
reasons for delaying the access process, they also provide it with the possibility of finding 
numerous ways of obstructing the linkages of IPPs to the transmission grid.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 Interview, Hilton Trollip (independent expert). 
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Figure 4.2 Breakdown of ESKOM’s maximum generation capacity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from ESKOM (2012). 
 
In terms of the distribution network, ESKOM also has monopoly control over exit points from 
the transmission grid. It supplies electricity both directly (60 per cent) to consumers and 
indirectly (40 per cent) through municipalities (the municipalities then redistribute electricity to 
their respective consumer base – an arrangement discussed later in this section) (GIZ 2013: 
30). Electricity unit tariffs are determined by NERSA, based on a multi-year price 
determination (MYPD) process. ESKOM can apply for a tariff adjustment, as it did in 2008 
and the years following in response to South Africa’s energy crisis, but NERSA has the 
ultimate power over whether, and to what extent, tariff increases are implemented.  
 
ESKOM’s mandate is dual in nature. As a parastatal public enterprise it falls under the 
oversight responsibility of the DPE, but, as the electricity provider, it purportedly falls under 
the policy direction of the DoE – supposedly answering to two ministries with very different 
objectives. This conflicting duality is evident in ESKOM’s two principal functions: (1) to 
provide affordable and reliable electricity to all South African businesses and households; 
and (2) to operate as an ‘engine of development’, catalysing economic growth, industrial 
expansion, and job creation.19 The contradiction between these two mandates is key to 
understanding ESKOM’s expressed decision-making processes, widely acknowledged 
inefficiencies in operation and the manner in which it uses this mandate in public 
pronouncements to defend its control over the entire electricity value chain.  
 
The internal structure of ESKOM is complex due to the multitude of its value chain 
responsibilities – as one interviewee stated, ESKOM is essentially three businesses located 
within one entity.20 The majority of its turnover is comprised of generation activities             
(60 per cent), followed by distribution (30 per cent) and transmission (10 per cent).21               
                                                        
19 Portfolio Committee on Energy (PCE) meeting at Parliament, 29 July 2014, ESKOM chairperson. 
20 Interview, Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
21 Interview, Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
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The reliance on generation revenue within ESKOM has major implications with regard to (1) 
the utility’s internal governance structure and (2) the utility’s priorities.  
 
Governance: The emphasis on generation turnover within ESKOM has translated to an 
asymmetrical internal power structure within the utility. Personnel within the generation 
sector tend to dominate governance structures within ESKOM’s larger corporate framework. 
Furthermore, because they capture the majority of turnover, they are also able to attract 
personnel with high capacities. This results in the following: (1) generation priorities (i.e. coal-
based generation priorities) are elevated above the needs of the transmission and 
distribution sectors; and (2) the knowledge and capacities specific to the generation sector 
are carried through to higher levels of decision-making. Consequently, ESKOM lacks a 
holistic knowledge base inclusive of distribution and transmission realities at the top level of 
its governance structure, resulting in the misalignment (and subsequent inefficiencies) 
between generation, transmission and distribution planning.22  
 
The governance issue is further complicated by the government’s reliance on ESKOM for 
energy-related policymaking. Due to the high level of technical capacity within ESKOM, its 
personnel are often ‘seconded to government bodies and subcommittees, which often rely on 
[ESKOM] rather than internal resources for technical expertise’ (Pegels 2014: 13). This 
allows for the asymmetrical power structure and knowledge base (one heavily weighted 
towards coal generation) to be filtered into other realms of energy policymaking – realms that 
should ideally operate independently of ESKOM’s influence.  
 
Priorities: Electricity generation is the driving force behind ESKOM’s actions. In order to 
maintain revenues, ESKOM must necessarily maintain its hold over South Africa’s electricity 
generation. This means that any attempt to introduce competition (e.g. IPPs) into the energy 
market will be opposed by ESKOM in order to keep its majority market share – an act of 
rational self-preservation. This opposition is not done overtly but, although ESKOM appears 
to be compliant, this is merely a facade. ESKOM will not directly oppose any energy policy 
that threatens to dismantle its monopoly, but will instead sit on its hands until the policy 
eventually dissipates (see Section 5 and Section 6 in the analytic narrative).23 This ‘wait and 
see’ strategy is highly effective given the amount of political weight ESKOM carries behind it 
through its close ties with African National Congress (ANC) political leaders and the EIUG. 
Generally speaking, if ESKOM does not explicitly support a policy, the policy will struggle to 
gain the political backing necessary to see it through to implementation. However, there is 
substantial evidence that this pattern is changing. The successful formulation and 
implementation of RE IPPPP, despite ESKOM’s absence from the process, holds great 
promise for the future of independent energy policymaking in South Africa. As long as 
renewable energies are not perceived to threaten the position of ESKOM within the market – 
that is, as long as coal continues to be the dominant source of energy generation in South 
Africa – or as long as ESKOM misjudges the likely effectiveness of a particular renewable 
energy policy (as it did in the RE IPPPP) and therefore ignores it, then renewable energy 
strategies are likely to have a greater chance of being successful.  
 
Renewable energy Independent Power Producers (IPPs)  
South Africa’s RE IPPPP programme, over three bidding rounds, has produced 64 
renewable energy IPPs with over 100 shareholding entities, generating a commitment of 
roughly US$14bn in investment in wind, PV, CSP, small hydro, and biomass projects 
(Eberhard et al. 2014). The majority of projects in Rounds 1 through 3 have been financed 
through project finance (although Round 3 witnessed a growing share of corporate financing) 
with debt funding sourced from commercial banks, development finance institutions, and 
pension and insurance funds – 86 per cent of which is sourced from within South Africa. This 
                                                        
22 Interview, Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
23 Interview, Anton Eberhard (independent expert). 
37 
 
level of interest, and subsequent success of RE IPPPP in harnessing that interest, has 
placed South Africa within the top ten countries in terms of global renewable energy 
investment (ibid.).  
 
The influence and priorities of the IPPs operating in South Africa’s RE IPPPP are 
representative of both domestic and international renewable energy private sector actors. 
These actors’ ultimate goal is profit and maintaining competitiveness in the market.  
 
The primary private sector drivers in South Africa’s case have been international wind and 
solar developers, and their associated international wind and solar sector lobbyists. The 
global economic crisis that began in 2008 negatively affected the renewable energy market 
in developed countries, primarily in Europe, a market that was already becoming saturated. 
This downturn provided the impetus for the private sector to look elsewhere – towards 
emerging economies, like South Africa and Brazil – to take advantage of opportunities 
presented by the prospect of large-scale national generation capacity programmes in wind 
and solar.  
 
The influence of the private sector and the international wind and solar lobby in the 
implementation of South Africa’s IPP programme was very significant. Encouraged by the 
initial development phases of NERSA’s feed-in tariff programme, international wind and solar 
developers began planning projects and lobbying for the programme’s approval.24 When it 
became apparent that the feed-in tariff programme was losing traction within government 
(described in detail in Section 6), the private sector swiftly realigned their support behind the 
development of RE IPPPP and played an integral role in its subsequent implementation. The 
amount of demonstrated private funding and technical experience that the private sector was 
willing to invest in South Africa became too large, and too public, to turn down.25  
 
The influence of a committed and vocal private sector created a highly pressurised situation 
for government: RE IPPPP had to work, and work well, or risk losing international confidence 
in South Africa as a viable and reliable renewable energy investment market.  
 
Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG) 
The Energy Intensive Users Group is a lobbying body for the largest industrial electricity 
users in South Africa. The vast majority of its membership is located in the mining (40 per 
cent) and manufacturing (46 per cent) sectors.26 Comprising 38 companies in total, the EIUG 
consumes more than 100GWh per year, roughly 44 per cent of total electricity use in the 
country (GIZ 2013; Burton 2011). In the past, many of these companies, including BHP 
Billiton and Anglo American, had long-term power contracts with ESKOM. ESKOM’s sale 
revenue was based on commodity prices and exchange rates, effectively allowing the 
companies to buy electricity at a much lower rate than the cost of production. These deals 
were made when energy supply was abundant and cheap in South Africa, but are no longer 
financially viable for the utility to maintain. Only BHP Billiton’s contract remains intact, with 
the rest of the EIUG paying ESKOM’s megaflex rates.  
 
The EIUG is charged with representing the interests of big industry in government. Its level of 
influence in terms of key relationships with government officials, close ties with the ANC and 
ability to impact policy formation and implementation is substantial. Historically, although not 
necessarily so in the current era, the EIUG and ESKOM have played a role in lobbying for 
mining-centric growth strategies (Pegels 2014).  
 
                                                        
24 Interview, Hilton Trollip (independent expert). 
25 This point was made repeatedly in different ways in the following interviews of independent experts – Anton Eberhard; Jon 
Kornik; Belynda Petrie; Hilton Trollip.   
26 www.eiug.org.za/about/membership/ (accessed 27 January 2015). 
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The EIUG’s one driving priority has been and will continue to be ensuring a reliable energy 
supply so that these companies can retain the low electricity prices upon which they have 
built their global competitiveness. In the past, maintaining low electricity prices meant 
aligning with ESKOM. However, ESKOM’s new generation expansion programme and the 
subsequent inefficiencies that have accompanied that process (as evidenced in the delays 
and costs associated with constructing Medupi and Kusile) have translated to increasing 
electricity tariffs. Figure 4.3, presented by EIUG at a meeting of the Technical Task Team 
charged with formulating the IRP, illustrates the body’s growing concern with the effect of 
these price hikes on South Africa’s global competitiveness. Furthermore, rolling blackouts 
during the 2008 energy crisis and subsequent periods of load-shedding in the years that 
followed, demonstrated ESKOM’s inability to guarantee a consistent supply of electricity.  
Figure 4.3 EIUG presentation on South Africa’s competitiveness 
Source: Adapted from Burton (2011). 
 
In the future, ESKOM may not be in a position to continue to offer the cheapest or most 
reliable energy supply in South Africa. Economies of scale and technological advancements 
have led to declining production costs for renewable energies and a cost-based case for 
renewables is strengthened further when taking into account the externalised costs of 
traditional fossil fuels (i.e. costs of environmental degradation and climate change) (BWE 
2012). Shifts in electricity costs will thus affect the EIUG’s relationship with ESKOM.  
 
The EIUG will continue to place its support behind any system that can guarantee the most 
reliable electricity at the lowest price. This system may take the shape of higher private 
sector participation in energy generation through expanded IPP programmes across multiple 
technologies, including coal and renewable energy. This future system may also involve 
intensive energy users building their own coal-fired plants, at a cost lower than ESKOM, to 
supply electricity for their own operations with the ability to sell excess generation back into 
the national grid through a future co-generation feed-in programme.27 
 
                                                        
27 Interview, Anton Eberhard (independent expert). 
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4.1.3 Civil society 
 
Labour unions 
The labour union stakeholders – primarily the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) and the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) – played a role 
in influencing energy policy and the energy sector institutional framework during the sector’s 
period of transition in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 1998 energy White Paper’s 
attempt to separate ESKOM’s functions into separate operating entities and open up the 
market to private sector generators was strongly opposed by organised labour. The period 
following the 1998 White Paper was one of misalignment between policymaking and policy 
implementation – a symptom of a country that was in the midst of a larger ideological debate 
over whether the private sector or the public sector should be the driving force in economic 
development. Organised labour, viewing the public sector as the preferred mechanism for 
sustained job creation and equitable distribution of development benefits, positioned itself on 
the side of state-owned enterprise-led development in South Africa.  
 
South African labour unions have historically supported ESKOM as a public sector 
corporation. However, this stance has become less clear in recent years in response to the 
largely private sector-led development of the renewable energy industry. Organised labour’s 
economic objectives are maintaining employment levels, supporting conditions of 
employment, and growing union membership. Publicly, in policy statements and speeches, 
unions such as NUMSA support the growth of the renewable energy sector as a means for 
job creation, encouraging ‘green growth’ and ‘green jobs’ (International Trade Union 
Confederation 2011). In reality, their ideological stance has not changed. It is built on the 
essential components of state-owned providers (which NUMSA calls ‘socially owned’) 
operating to facilitate employment and provide public goods to reduce inequality. Hence, as 
long as private sector participation in renewable energy does not affect the position of 
ESKOM as a public entity with a broad developmental mandate, the unions will not oppose 
the expansion of the renewable energy sector, although they would prefer this was based on 
a greater public sector role (NUMSA 2012, 2013).  
 
Communities and households  
At the bottom of this electricity value chain are the household consumers. They are the least 
influential actor in the decision-making process, but are ultimately the most affected by 
process outcomes. South Africa’s history of extremely low electricity prices has resulted in 
industry and household consumers alike constructing their operations around the assumption 
that electricity rates will remain cheap. Rising electricity prices have resulted in anger and 
frustration among the populace. However, household consumers are not organised around 
this issue, and despite the public outcry that occasions a demand for a price increase from 
ESKOM, this does not translate into political struggles at the local or national government 
election level. The impact is hence indirect and not directly felt by government or ESKOM. 
 
In contrast to consumers in countries like Germany with highly developed renewable energy 
markets, these concerns do not translate into ‘green’ political and organisational agendas. 
South African consumers do not rate environmental and climate change concerns as a top 
priority. Moreover, their concerns about electricity supply, load-shedding resulting in ESKOM 
intermittently imposing rolling blackouts, and escalating prices, no matter how vociferously 
expressed in the media, are politically diffused and instead find expression in a variety of 
dispersed outlets. Pegels (2014) cites a recent survey conducted by the DoE in 2012, the 
results of which show that 75 per cent of the population would support the government’s 
prioritisation of low electricity prices, while only 22 per cent would support the prioritisation of 
renewable energy subsidies, ranking last amongst the list of possible priorities (Figure 4.4).  
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Figure 4.4 Electricity policy preferences of South Africans 
Source: Adapted from DoE (2012: 79). 
 
Because electricity price is the primary concern of the population, the average consumer’s 
‘willingness to pay’ for the added ‘tax’ of a renewable energy programme is minimal. This 
concern – although driven by more powerful industrial players with similar priorities – played 
a large role in the ultimate decision of implementing a competitive bidding programme as 
opposed to a renewable energy feed-in tariff. It also played a subsequent role in the design 
of RE IPPPP. The selection criteria were crafted to include baseline thresholds for job 
creation, local economic development, and local ownership in order to win the support of the 
consumer base (and the more influential support of the DTI), and particularly the 
communities directly affected by the wind and solar farm infrastructural development. The 
economic development components of RE IPPPP have yet to show conclusive results and 
face many challenges (discussed in further detail in Section 6.3). Whether they prove to be 
successful in delivering benefits and gaining the support of local communities remains to be 
seen and is an important topic for future research.  
4.2  Analysis of stakeholder priorities and level of influence28 
The purpose of this section is to understand the basis for the various stakeholders’ 
involvement in renewable energy. It provides an analytic framework for analysing and 
mapping the priorities and levels of influence of the various actors and institutions, situating 
each stakeholder within the framework so as to locate the critical driving forces facilitating or 
constraining climate change policies. In many senses it is the static core of the project and 
the foundation for the dynamic processes discussed in the analytic narrative of periodisation 
that follows. 
 
Figure 4.5 illustrates these two dimensions – priority and influence – within one graphic. The 
x axis specifies what these actors and institutions are primarily concerned with, and driven by 
– i.e. climate change, energy security, monopoly value chain control, final consumer 
electricity prices, industrial diversification and job creation, profit and competitiveness. The y 
axis evaluates each stakeholder’s influence according to high, medium, or low levels of 
                                                        
28 The source for the figures on ‘influence’ and ‘priorities’ (Figures 4.5 and 7.1) is based on the authors’ judgements regarding 
the political economy dynamics prevalent within the value chain and the institutional stakeholders. It is derived from the authors’ 
research – various expert interviews and reading of the secondary literature. The levels of influence and priority were a focus of 
discussion within expert interviews. The final representation and weight accorded was ‘tested’ so to make sure that it did not 
contain gross misrepresentations. However, the authors take sole responsibility for the graphic interpretation and presentation 
of these political economy dynamics.  
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influence with regard to their ability to facilitate or constrain climate change policies. Each 
actor is designated by their name, as well as in brackets an appellation specifying 
institutional location, and sphere of operation. Institutional location is represented by (G) for 
within or accountable to government, (B) private sector business, and (C) for actors within 
civil society. In addition, government is further broken into an independent agency 
responsible to government departments (GA) for NERSA, and (GP) for a parastatal state-
owned enterprise with government as the sole shareholder (ESKOM). Sphere of operation is 
represented by national (N) or local (L). The number at the end of the appellation simply 
differentiates each stakeholder within each category.  
 
In order to locate the stakeholders within the framework it is necessary to limit the scope of 
the policy issues at hand. For the purpose of this report, the policy focus will be on South 
Africa’s renewable energy policies, specifically the creation and implementation of South 
Africa’s current renewable energy IPP programme. In other words, it is focused on the 
current stage within the periodisation framework analysed in Section 5. The relative levels of 
influence are determined according to the demonstrated level of power that each stakeholder 
has to ‘make or break’ the programme – whether the stakeholders act on that capacity is 
another question. For example, ESKOM has a high level of influence over whether             
RE IPPPP is successful as it controls the distribution and transmission networks necessary 
to connect the IPPs to the national grid. However, whether or not ESKOM exerts that 
influence to facilitate or obstruct the implementation of RE IPPPP is subject to a complex set 
of factors that cannot be represented in the graphic.  
 
This example illustrates the inherent shortcomings of any attempt to translate a dynamic and 
complex process within the confines of a static representation. While Figure 4.5 is useful to 
give a generalised overview of the manner in which South Africa’s renewable energy policy 
was formulated and implemented, it has its limitations. Each stakeholder is motivated by 
many, sometimes overlapping priorities, which often fluctuate in response to a set of hard-to-
predict variables (timing, internal leadership, external pressure, etc). The same holds true for 
levels of influence, which may vary at any time given the contextual realities of the situation. 
Finally the representation in Figure 4.5 is bounded by time frames contained in any 
periodisation and is hence specific to the latest period under discussion. As it stands, the 
recent intervention of the Presidency in pushing the nuclear option for its own interests may 
well shift the political economy parameters of influence and policy priority in the coming 
years.  
 
What can be gained from this representation are the general observations which follow and 
which serve to form a foundation of understanding upon which a more nuanced analysis 
surrounding South Africa’s renewable energy policies can be built in the following section. 
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Figure 4.5 Level of influence and policy priority of stakeholders  
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
The following is apparent from Figure 4.5: 
 
 Climate change mitigation is not a major motivating priority of the key stakeholders, 
especially those with high levels of influence.  
 The primary driving force of government and business is to ensure reliable energy 
supply. This is a function of the crisis in electricity supply that has plagued the 
economy since the turn of the millennium. This maintains ESKOM’s position of 
relative influence, since no actor/institution is going to rock the boat and threaten 
energy security, but it also opens space to clip its wings for those pushing for 
renewable energy as additional sources of electricity supply.  
 A secondary driver is the need to ameliorate the escalating cost of electricity for 
businesses and households, which is integral to, and a direct consequence of, the 
energy security crisis.  
 Although the price of electricity for final consumers is a major issue, the level of 
influence they have, especially householders and local government, is limited.  
 Big business has greater influence than householders but its major concern in this 
respect is to ensure stable electricity supply. This is, however, not to underplay the 
impact of raised prices on its operational abilities. 
 While mandated with meeting South Africa’s energy demands, ESKOM’s (and by 
association the DPE’s) foremost concern is self-preservation within the electricity 
value chain – i.e. maintaining its monopoly hold on the generation, transmission and 
distribution activities in South Africa.  
 Given the need to maintain energy security, in terms of the ability to exercise 
influence, there is an intricate balancing act taking place between the major 
stakeholders over shoring up ESKOM and developing IPPs as an additional form of 
renewable energy supply.  
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5 Periodisation of the analytic narrative  
5.1 Context – historical relationship between ESKOM, coal and 
large industry 
Apartheid-era (pre-1994) energy policy was based on providing low-cost energy supplies to 
the mining and primary industries and energy security for the apartheid state. This was 
reflected in the distribution of electricity supply. Industry and mining consumed 60 per cent of 
electricity, whilst residential consumers accounted for only 16–18 per cent. This historical 
foundation created a path dependency ensuring that industrial unit prices for electricity are 
cheaper than average residential prices. For example, a low price deal between ESKOM and 
the Australian mining corporation BHP Billiton estimates the price paid by the corporation at 
about 350 per cent less than low-income residential customers in 2008/09 and less than half 
of ESKOM’s reported production price in the period (Greenpeace Africa 2012). Moreover, in 
2011, mining and industry paid an average of 36.2c/kWh while between 4 to 5 million direct 
residential customers paid 66.4c/kWh (Greenpeace Africa 2012).29 
5.2  Building a policy framework and ESKOM’s role in flux: 
1998–2005 
By the late 1990s, three trends coalesced to provide the political impetus for reform of the 
energy sector: (1) the global ‘intellectual momentum’ behind democratisation and 
privatisation of energy generation; (2) the post-apartheid pressure to address the vastly 
unequal access to electricity between white and black communities; and (3) the need to 
improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through corporatisation, 
governance reform, taxation reform, and regulation and monitoring mechanisms (Eberhard 
2005).  
5.2.1 The formation of the White Paper on Energy Policy 
In response to these pressures, the government published the White Paper on Energy Policy 
in December 1998. The aim of the White Paper was to incentivise private sector competition 
in the energy sector, encouraging private firms building and connecting coal-fired power 
stations to the grid (DME 1998). This also provided the South African government with a 
rationale for breaking up ESKOM’s monopoly over electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution.  
 
The White Paper was supported by South African industrial and residential consumers alike, 
who hoped that competition in the electricity sector would help maintain low energy prices. In 
principle, ESKOM also supported the document, but was wary of any further efforts to eat 
away at its hold on electricity generation. In practice, the utility fought against any attempt to 
unbundle its activities into separate entities.30 In an attempt to stall moves towards 
privatisation, ESKOM suggested the establishment of a private equity partner under the 
umbrella of ESKOM Holdings. ESKOM also suggested placing its transmission and 
distribution activities into subsidiary entities within ESKOM Holdings – all attempts to 
maintain control over the entire energy system (Eberhard 2005).  
                                                        
29 All references to cents per kilowatt are Rand cents unless otherwise stated.  
30 Interviews, Belynda Petrie (independent expert), Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
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5.2.2 The restructuring of ESKOM 
The White Paper was followed in April 2000 by a World Bank-sponsored ministerial 
workshop on electricity supply industry reform. The end result of the workshop, which 
included international experts, representatives from relevant ministries, as well as ESKOM 
and NERSA (then NER), was a draft policy paper. ESKOM vehemently opposed several 
elements of the draft – most significantly, the recommendation to limit ESKOM’s share of 
electricity generation to 35 per cent – and lobbied hard against the proposed reforms (DME 
2000). The result was a partially watered down version of the draft, published in 2001, which 
proposed the following: 
 
 ESKOM’s share of the market would be maintained at no less than 70 per cent; 
 Vertical unbundling would occur by initially creating a separate transmission company 
under ESKOM Holdings that would later operate independently of the utility; 
 A multi-market model would be used to reconfigure the electricity market framework – 
this system would include a variety of platforms and independent government 
mechanisms; 
 A regulatory framework would be established to allow for the entrance of independent 
power producers (IPPs), allowing for the diversification of the market and a 
mechanism for private sector investment.  
 
In August 2000, the DPE published A Policy Framework: An Accelerated Agenda towards 
the Restructuring of State-owned Enterprises, which targeted ESKOM, among other SOEs, 
in order to clarify its mandate and relationship to the state. The intention of the DPE was to 
corporatise ESKOM, create different entities within ESKOM for transmission, distribution and 
generation, as well as to form different companies within ESKOM’s generation entity to 
facilitate internal competition before the entrance of the private sector. This corporatisation 
process would have the effect of starting the process of creating separate businesses within 
ESKOM – each with their own accounting, costing and profit structure – which would lead in 
the longer term to an unbundling of the corporation and a break-up of its monopoly hold over 
the value chain. This framework reiterated the strategy proposed in both the energy White 
Paper and the subsequent Ministerial Workshop draft policy paper.  
 
Government’s attempt to chip away ESKOM’s monopoly was further etched into the policy 
framework in 2001 when the cabinet ruled that ESKOM was no longer allowed to build 
further generation capacity.  
 
The effort to restructure ESKOM was strongly opposed by organised labour (COSATU), 
arguing that the corporatisation of ESKOM would place upward pressure on electricity prices 
and the move towards privatisation would impede its developmental function and place 
employment at risk (Tinto 2002, cited in Eberhard 2005). In response to COSATU’s 
opposition, the ESKOM Conversion Bill in 2001 was amended to include a clause protecting 
ESKOM’s development mandate and labour force. Opposition continued into 2002 when 
COSATU held a national strike against the privatisation of ESKOM and other SOEs. This 
prompted a fierce debate in government and further delayed any plans for restructuring.  
 
The role that organised labour played in delaying ESKOM’s restructuring is significant. 
Labour unions have played, and continue to play, an important role in maintaining ESKOM’s 
incumbent position. Their role in the current energy sector debates, especially those 
surrounding renewable energy generation, has not been adequately addressed in the 
existing literature. The dynamics of how their position on privatisation and diversification of 
the energy supply has persisted or evolved given the current period of energy transition has 
two dimensions: (a) formal statements and policy positions on renewable energy, and         
(b) actual involvement in any processes and coalitions. Generally speaking, despite relatively 
positive formal statements and policy positions, the unions have been primarily concerned 
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with maintaining existing levels of employment and hence membership. As long as ESKOM 
remained a public entity with a broad mandate, and issues of privatisation in the policy 
discourse were not on the agenda, the union movement in reality focused its attention and 
activities elsewhere.  
 
In 2002, when the ESKOM Conversion Act was finalised, ESKOM was transformed into a 
public enterprise with the government as sole shareholder. Its new mandate attempted to 
balance the utility’s role as (1) a provider of affordable electricity and (2) an ‘engine of 
development’.31 It is important to note that ESKOM continues to face the pressures of this 
conflicting dual mandate. This contradiction is key to understanding the motive behind 
ESKOM’s poor decision-making, both in the past and in the present.  
5.2.3 Restructuring abandoned, ESKOM’s role solidified  
2004 marked a shift in government policy as a result of two important events. First, it became 
clear that South Africa was quickly depleting its energy reserve margin. Once this emerged in 
the public sphere, government came under heavy political pressure from industry, organised 
labour, and residential consumers to secure energy supply and maintain the low prices that 
they had become accustomed to. Second, the 2004 elections brought in a new minister of 
public enterprises, whose platform was based on a political consensus that SOEs should be 
the driving force in infrastructure investment as a means to accelerated economic growth and 
job creation. He was clearly opposed to any attempt to dilute ESKOM’s monopoly hold over 
the value chain and the drive to separate businesses within its corporate structure which had 
developed its own dynamic towards an internal market. The new minister ensured that 
ESKOM was suddenly awash with posters declaring ‘One ESKOM’ which clearly stopped 
this dynamic in its tracks.32 The minister’s stance was indicative of a broader ideological shift 
in the developing world that SOEs should play a key role in government-led economic 
development. Eberhard (2005: 36) describes this shift as a response to a ‘decade of market-
friendly reforms’ that resulted in ‘inadequate economic growth and job creation, and 
persistent poverty among a significant proportion of the population’. Given these realities, the 
state adopted a public sector-led development approach predicated on the key role of SOEs 
as drivers of economic growth and job creation – a shift that left little room for the introduction 
of privatisation and competition into the energy sector.  
 
A survey of relevant stakeholders conducted by NERSA (then NER) in 2004 revealed that 
electricity users were seriously concerned about the reliability of electricity supply (Eberhard 
2005). They feared that policy indecision was preventing essential decisions from being 
made about expansion of the distribution network and generation capacity. These delays 
would have deleterious effects on industry in the near future. Industry’s previous support for 
competition and privatisation in the hopes of maintaining low energy prices waned, given the 
reality of urgent energy needs and a sluggish political process. Industrial support shifted to 
the incumbent power that could address their practical needs – i.e. ESKOM itself.  
 
In 2004, under intense pressure to increase generation capacity quickly, government 
appointed a technical advisor to design a tender process to introduce IPP participation into 
the energy sector. The competitive multi-market model built into the energy policy framework 
just a few years prior was abandoned. Instead, IPPs would operate within the existing 
system with ESKOM as the single buyer.  
 
The subsequent procurement programmes run by ESKOM were, unsurprisingly, 
unsuccessful. The final result was a few power purchase agreements with industrial 
generators for less than 400MW. Not one renewable energy PPA was licensed. Furthermore, 
electricity prices in South Africa at this time were the lowest in the world – up until as late as 
                                                        
31 PCE meeting at Parliament, 29 July 2014, ESKOM chairperson. 
32 Interview, Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
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2007, ESKOM’s average electricity price was 2.5USc/kWh. As long as ESKOM’s tariffs 
remained close to the marginal cost of production, IPPs could not possibly compete.  
 
The slow progress towards building a successful IPP procurement framework and the little 
success in garnering private sector interest did not bode well for the future of the IPP 
programme. It quickly became clear that the introduction of IPPs to fill the 30 per cent share 
of generation allotted in the White Paper could not occur at a rate fast enough, nor at a scale 
large enough, to address the depleting reserve margin.  
 
Faced with the reality of a looming energy crisis, energy security became the primary driver 
in decision-making processes. In June 2004, in a parliamentary speech, the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy conceded, ‘the state has to put security of supply above all and above 
competition especially’ (Eberhard 2007: 251). The ambitious restructuring plans were set 
aside. Government reneged on its 2001 ruling and authorised ESKOM to begin building 
power plants again, forced to turn to ESKOM as the ‘supplier of last resort’ (Eberhard 2005: 
5316). 
 
Box 5.1 Summary: building a policy framework and ESKOM’s role  
  in flux: 1998–2005 
 
1. In 1998, international pressure to privatise and diversify, coupled with support from the private 
sector and residential consumers, allowed a policy framework to be put in place that 
sanctioned the restructuring of ESKOM and the entry of IPPs.  
2. However, no regulatory framework for IPP procurement was established, rendering 
implementation of the new policies impossible.  
3. Furthermore, electricity prices in South Africa during this period were among the lowest in the 
world, which ultimately deterred private sector actors from entering the market, especially 
those in renewable energy.  
4. Faced with a looming energy crisis, government gave way to pressure from industry, unions, 
and voters to maintain the energy supply at low prices and abandoned its plans for 
restructuring ESKOM.  
5. Any attempt within government to build a coalition of influence in favour of renewable energy 
supply melted away when faced with the energy security crisis and the power of the 
ESKOM/DPE lobby. 
6. At the end of the period, ESKOM remained a vertically integrated monopoly power maintaining 
control over the value chain – the incumbent regime was preserved.  
7. ‘Policy developments ran ahead of the political process… There was thus never any strong 
political leadership to implement the proposed reforms’ (Eberhard 2005: 5316). In short, policy 
formation was influenced and driven by private energy analysts and international consultants 
providing backing to government officials, but it lacked the political backing necessary for 
implementation.  
5.3  Conflicting energy policies and political gridlock: 2005–2009 
With the palpable and imminent energy crisis facing the country, plans to restructure ESKOM 
were put on hold. The result was that from 2005 to 2009 South Africa’s energy policy, and 
stance towards renewable energy was confused and muddled.  
5.3.1 ESKOM’s expansion programme: Medupi and Kusile  
In 2005, ESKOM began its generation expansion programme, moving forward with plans to 
build two very large new ‘clean coal’ power plants, Medupi and Kusile – each producing 
about 4,800MW. The total cost of the expansion was estimated to cost roughly US$50bn 
(although this number has since risen dramatically due to construction time delays), half of 
which was expected to be financed by ESKOM itself.33 
                                                        
33 http://mg.co.za/article/2009-09-10-Eskom-crisis-will-spark-new-deal (accessed 27 January 2015). 
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In 2009, on the back of the 2008 electricity crisis, it became apparent that ESKOM was 
facing a funding crisis, unable to finance the massive expansion programme necessary to 
meet electricity demand (Van Gelder and Spaargaren 2010). That year, the National 
Treasury approved a US$9bn loan to ESKOM, in addition to a US$18.1bn debt guarantee, 
granted specifically for the funding of Medupi’s construction. Even with the massive injection 
of government capital, ESKOM still faced a funding gap of roughly US$8.1bn.34 
 
In 2010, the World Bank made the controversial decision to grant South Africa a US$3.75bn 
loan to help finance the construction of Medupi and Kusile (see Box 5.3). The World Bank 
justified the grant on the grounds that Medupi and Kusile would use ‘clean’ supercritical coal 
technology, and would require US$260m of the loan to be spent on two additional renewable 
energy projects, the Sere Wind Farm and Upington Solar Power Plant (Baker et al. 2014: 
17).  
 
Inefficiencies in the building of Medupi and Kusile have put the power plants more than two 
years behind schedule. In 2014, ESKOM started servicing the debt raised on the capacity 
building programme. However, neither Medupi, nor Kusile are currently producing any power, 
providing no revenue stream for ESKOM, and further compounding its funding crisis. In 
2010, ESKOM received an ‘equity injection’ of roughly US$2bn from government to enable 
ESKOM to accelerate its international borrowing in order to continue to build Medupi and 
Kusile, as well as complete the necessary upgrade of the transmission network.35 In April 
2014, ESKOM went to government for a further US$5bn ‘equity injection’. The Treasury has 
agreed to a further equity injection and R10bn is planned to be made available by June 2015.  
5.3.2 The creation of NERSA  
In November 2005, NERSA replaced NER as a result of the National Regulator Act of 2004. 
Its mandate and relationship with ESKOM was later defined in the Electricity Regulation Act 
(ERA) in 2006. Given the solidification of ESKOM’s role in the previous period, the ERA is an 
important document that clearly spells out the governance structure of the energy sector. The 
ERA stipulates that ESKOM is the sole purchaser of generated electricity in South Africa, 
thereby maintaining its control over the electricity value chain – a ruling that essentially shut 
down any hope of privatisation of the market through a competitive power exchange model. 
This had major implications for any future IPP programmes.  
 
The ERA redefined the role of NERSA as the protector and enforcer of the national electricity 
policy framework. It stipulated that NERSA was to act within the guidelines of the forthcoming 
Integrated Resource Plan (the first iteration of which was only released at the end of 2009). 
NERSA ultimately determines electricity tariffs; grants licences for the generation, distribution 
and transmission of electricity; and controls the import and export of electricity.  
5.3.3 Energy crisis 2007/08  
In 2007 and 2008, South Africa experienced rolling blackouts as a result of rising demand 
and inadequate generation capacity. ESKOM and government had been aware of the 
upcoming crisis for some time. The rapid electrification expansion programme initiated in the 
1990s (which raised levels of household connectivity from 30 per cent in 1994 to 87 per cent 
in 2012) and steady growth of industry placed heavy strain on South Africa’s generation 
capacity (DoE 2012). During this time of consistently increasing demand and decreasing 
reserve margins, investment in new generation capacity was delayed until 2004. The 
question that is raised is: why did this happen?  
 
                                                        
34 http://mg.co.za/article/2009-09-10-Eskom-crisis-will-spark-new-deal (accessed 27 January 2015). 
35 www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/funding-gap-becomes-plan-as-sa-confirms-r20bn-Eskom-equity-injection-2010-11-11 
(accessed 27 January 2015). 
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Pegels (2014), supported by information gained from our key expert interviews, cites 
ESKOM’s dual mandate as the reason for this glaring misjudgment. The pressure on 
ESKOM to maintain low prices – that the consumers had become accustomed to and that 
industry had built their competitive advantage around – resulted in delayed decision-making 
when it became time to commit to the construction of new power stations, even in the face of 
decreasing reserves. By the time ESKOM and government made the decision to proceed 
with building plans, it was too late.  
 
It is estimated that the blackouts ultimately cost the economy US$7.1bn (Swilling and 
Anneke 2012). After 2008, the DME and ESKOM published a policy paper entitled National 
Response to South Africa’s Electricity Shortages, which essentially set forth plans to 
recommission 1,463MW of older generation capacity that had previously been mothballed, 
and to accelerate the construction of Medupi and Kusile.  
5.3.4 Electricity tariff increases 
In accordance with its mandate as stipulated in the ERA, NERSA began enacting sharp 
increases in electricity tariffs in 2006 to fund ESKOM’s massive expansion programme. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the severity of these price increases. In 2008, ESKOM requested a     
60 per cent increase in the electricity tariff in response to the now urgent energy crisis at 
hand. NERSA responded by authorising a 27.5 per cent increase in 2008, and a further    
31.3 per cent increase in 2009 (Pegels 2014). In April 2010, NERSA approved a further 
three-year tariff increase of 25 per cent each year until 2013. In March 2013, NERSA agreed 
to 8 per cent increases per year until 2018 in response to ESKOM’s request for a 16 per cent 
increase. According to ESKOM, NERSA’s refusal to grant the utility the 16 per cent tariff 
increase created a financing gap of US$28bn for a five-year period, beginning in 2013 
(ESKOM 2013). This move by NERSA is still cited by ESKOM’s board of directors as the 
main contributor to ESKOM’s current financial turmoil.36 
Figure 5.1 Average nominal and real ESKOM electricity prices 
(USc/kWh)  
Note: Exchange rate R10/US$1.  
Source: Adapted from Eberhard et al. (2014), constructed from data extracted from ESKOM annual reports and StatsSA. 
 
                                                        
36 PCE meeting at Parliament, 29 July 2014. 
49 
 
It is estimated that electricity prices could rise as high as 110USc/kWh by 2020 (Creamer 
Media 2011). The impact that these increases have had and will continue to have on the 
global competitiveness of energy-intensive industries is a point of major concern, eliciting 
mounting pressure from the EIUG and the Chamber of Mines on ESKOM and the 
government to restrict tariff increases (EIUG 2013).  
 
Furthermore, increasing tariffs cause major issues for the municipalities that have a stake in 
keeping prices low to maintain their profit margins. Many municipalities ‘live off the mark-up’ 
they attach to ESKOM’s rate (Kaplan et al. 2014). A recent GIZ analysis of South Africa’s 
electricity sector reported that the sale of electricity is the primary source of income for most 
municipalities – e.g. it accounts for 21 per cent of the City of Johannesburg’s operating 
budget (GIZ 2013). Rising electricity prices mean lower profit margins for municipalities or, 
alternatively, pressure to maintain mark-ups to ensure cash inflow. However, the latter path 
has resulted in negative backlash from residents and the increasing inability of customers to 
pay for electricity, which subsequently results in the inability of municipalities to pay ESKOM 
for supply. In 2014, ESKOM reported that municipal debt has grown exponentially – today 
totalling R2.9bn – further adding to ESKOM’s funding crisis.  
 
The establishment of NERSA created an important institutional link in the value chain. 
Established as the regulator, seemingly independent and standing above the other links, in 
reality it acted as a buffer for government and ESKOM in respect of the crisis of rapidly rising 
electricity prices.37 Although this appeared as a distribution issue, the rapidly escalating price 
of electricity was fundamentally a generation problem at heart. As the regulator making the 
ultimate decision on the back of recommendations it received, NERSA’s political role was to 
partially deflect responsibility for future price increases and supply problems away from both 
ESKOM and government. On the one hand, the increasing heat prevalent in the society for 
the lack of heat generated by systemic value chain failure could be shifted onto NERSA for 
unpopular price increases. On the other, if it failed to agree to these demands for multiple, 
rapid and continuous increases, then ESKOM could shift the blame for its financial woes 
(and hence financial inability to raise the capital to deal with adequate electricity generation) 
onto NERSA. The problem was externalised out of the corporation and presented in the form 
of ‘if we can’t get price increases then we are dependent on borrowing’.  
 
Simultaneously, there was confusion about the exact scope of NERSA’s role. As the 
regulator, independent of ESKOM, it was also charged with controlling the import and export 
of electricity. But in what sense? In a purely administrative sense of granting licences, or was 
it supposed to have a more fundamental role as an independent quasi-government agency 
intervening and managing the process? If the latter then this would have had fundamental 
implications for breaking the hold ESKOM had over the electricity value chain, particularly in 
respect of creating space for renewable energy generation.  
5.3.5 The introduction of REFIT 
At the time of the first set of tariff increases and the construction of Medupi and Kusile, the 
government was still in the midst of a deadlock over the IPP issue. The IPP framework that 
had been put in place as early as 1998 had not produced any meaningful results. Support for 
IPP development from the wind and solar industries, NGOs, and foreign donors and 
consultants, was growing. Yet, ESKOM continued to block any progress made towards 
creating a regulatory framework for IPP participation.  
 
It has been argued that the creation of NERSA offered a new opportunity for a structural 
break in respect of renewable energy alternatives (Baker et al. 2014). The essence of this 
view is the following. As the body became more regulatory with the ERA in 2006, NERSA 
gained some independence from ESKOM and, unlike ESKOM, was able to be influenced by 
                                                        
37 Interview, Anton Eberhard (independent expert), who makes a similar point. 
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the growing body of renewable energy supporters. Clearly NERSA was more approachable, 
as one expert supportive of renewable energy interviewed explains: ‘If we went to ESKOM, 
we would be dead before we started. If we went to the DME, it would be the same as going 
to ESKOM’.38   
 
According to Baker et al. (2014), the new institutional arrangements allowed for a small 
group of individuals within NERSA as a ‘niche intervention’ to begin developing the 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) programme in 2006/07. ‘Inspired by study tours to 
Germany and Denmark’ they pushed NERSA to develop and promote REFIT. In so doing, 
NERSA acted beyond its mandate, Baker et al. (2014) argue, since under the 2006 ERA, it is 
the DoE’s responsibility to set policy, while NERSA’s implementation role is licensing and 
regulation. Hence in this version it appears that NERSA saw the 2005 National Regulator Act 
as an opening to forge its own policy mandate. The net result of this active intervention by 
NERSA was that by late 2010 REFIT had become so ‘high profile and apparently irreversible’ 
that it was removed from NERSA and ESKOM jurisdiction and taken over by the DoE (Baker 
et al. 2014). 
 
The fact that NERSA’s director encouraged international wind and solar developers to not 
only begin to develop projects but also make their presence known in South Africa is seen as 
further evidence of NERSA’s interventionist, proactive role in promoting interest in the REFIT 
programme (Baker et al. 2014). Many international companies such as Suzlon Energy 
(India), Goldwind Africa (China) and Vestas (Denmark) set up offices in South Africa. Private 
sector commitment grew and firms began planning projects, eager to take advantage of 
South Africa’s renewable energy potential. Much of this intense interest can be attributed to 
the timing of REFIT’s development. The programme design process coincided with a 
saturation of the market for wind and solar technologies in Europe. Companies looking to 
expand to different markets jumped on the potential opportunities that REFIT presented.  
 
While this is one interpretation of the events that transpired during the beginning of the 
REFIT design, there is little consistency as to NERSA’s role in this narrative. When NER was 
created in 1995, it consisted mostly of former ESKOM employees. However, over time, 
Eberhard (2005: 5312) argues, NER (and later NERSA) emerged as ‘one of the more 
capable and independent regulatory institutions in the African continent’. Baker et al.       
(2014: 9) attribute a proactive independent role to it, yet describe NERSA as ‘backed by 
ESKOM’, in opposition to the DoE ‘backed by National Treasury’. These conflicting 
interpretations of NERSA’s loyalties and motivations provide little clarity as to why and how 
South Africa’s renewable energy programme was able to gain traction.  
 
The interviews conducted for this report diverge from the story previously presented. Our 
research found that the birth of REFIT was not a result of a ‘niche intervention’ by individuals 
within NERSA.  
 
Firstly, this ‘niche intervention’ view misunderstands how an independent regulatory 
institution such as NERSA operates within the institutional configuration of the State. Yes, it 
is independent in the sense that it has an independent board and does not always give 
ESKOM what it wants, but this does not mean it isn’t/wasn’t in constant communication with 
and under pressure from various government departments (and ESKOM). In reality, NERSA 
is fundamentally a reactive government body, rather than being a proactive agency. It is set 
up to ensure that its business is regulation not policymaking or implementation. NERSA had 
neither the institutional capabilities nor powers to make policy or drive REFIT. As a high level 
official within NERSA summed it up in contesting this view: ‘We are receivers (of policy), not 
makers’.39  
                                                        
38 Interview, industry expert (confidential). 
39 Interview, Rod Crompton (NERSA). 
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Secondly, NERSA as an institution, or individuals within it, could make proposals but its 
formal administrative actions (i.e. interventions) are responsive. As one interviewee put it: 
‘NERSA makes many suggestions, most of which die, so the real issue is not what is tossed 
out, but why some ideas get taken up and driven by other powerful actors’.40 
Thirdly, the ideas underlying a feed-in tariff were being discussed and proposed in the 
renewable energy space a number of years before REFIT emerged formally.41 Clearly 
NERSA played an important administrative role in regard to formalising tariff pricing 
regulations – it was their regulatory role. Indeed individuals within NERSA could well have 
supported REFIT, but this is very different from intervening as a proactive independent 
agency lobbying and implementing a new space for renewable energy.  
 
Instead, it appears that, as an institution, NERSA’s role in REFIT was a result of it acting in 
response to government, heavily influenced by the DEA’s push for integrating renewables 
and the international pressure created by the approaching Copenhagen Accords. Our 
findings suggest that NERSA did not take a leadership role in developing a renewable 
energy programme, but was merely executing orders by the state.  
 
This interpretation of the events, gleaned from our interviews, also sheds new light on why 
REFIT eventually met its demise and offers an alternative possible explanation for why 
ESKOM allowed NERSA to proceed with the REFIT design process. Government handed 
over responsibility to the Department of Environmental Affairs which is notoriously politically 
weak in the Cabinet. The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), under which it should 
fall, was not going to pick up this ball and play with it. This ministry was dominated by the 
minerals division which was focused on facilitating mining investment, and since coal mining 
was a key minerals player this meant backing ESKOM. Moreover, key factions within the 
ANC alliance (including COSATU and the Communist Party) were ideologically opposed to 
the whole concept of power production independent of the state parastatal ESKOM. As one 
expert put it: ‘When they hear IPP all they hear is just the P of privatisation’42 – and 
privatisation was seen as a major political bogey to which they were implacably opposed. 
These divisions in the governing party were reflected within the state apparatuses 
themselves. In reality this effectively sidelined REFIT within government and effectively 
paralysed the ability of the state to intervene in the process.  
 
This created a problem of institutional incoherence since, if NERSA was to drive REFIT, as a 
regulatory body it had neither the will nor the capacity do so. It was simply not managerially 
and administratively capable of undertaking this task. This also explains why ESKOM did not 
even bother to publicly oppose REFIT, since it did not perceive it to be a threat and, in its 
assessment, it was bound to fail. Without a committed ‘champion’ for renewable energy, 
REFIT had little hope of success.  
 
Finally, the electricity supply and pricing crisis, which came to the fore at this time, also 
ensured that REFIT could not take off. Clearly there was support for renewable energy. 
There were individuals in the public and private sector both pushing for it and being 
encouraged by the publication of the REFIT guidelines. However, electricity was driven by 
the need both to ensure supply and to maintain cheap unit costs. When it became clear that 
the REFIT process would have to set prices for the IPPs well above that which ESKOM 
supplied, key sections within the state ran scared. Indeed, in the absence of a strong 
champion, the DME ensured that government scuttled straight back into the arms of ESKOM 
as the certain option. 
 
                                                        
40 Interview, Hilton Trollip (independent expert). 
41 Interview, Belynda Petrie (independent expert). 
42 Interview, Hilton Trollip (independent expert). 
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The planning of the feed-in tariff was plagued with policy incoherence, uncertainty and 
confusion – the result of continued resistance from an incumbent regime battling to maintain 
power over energy generation. From the inception of the REFIT planning process, it took 
NERSA three years to produce a set of feed-in tariffs and four years to produce a draft of the 
IPP selection criteria. However, an important practical effect of NERSA publishing 
administrative regulations for REFIT was that it galvanised the international private sector 
involved in renewable energy to start planning and pushing the policy space envelope. In this 
sense it opened up the space for other actors, which was important in creating a structural 
break in the next period, but it was an unintentional side effect rather than a ‘niche 
intervention’. As we shall see below, this also explains why the process was eventually 
removed from the hands of NERSA and captured by a coalition of motivated stakeholders 
who were able to garner the funding and the capacity necessary to build a successful 
programme. 
 
Box 5.2  Summary: conflicting energy policies and political gridlock: 
  2005–2009 
 
1. This is a period where ESKOM was able to use the energy security crisis to exercise influence 
and mount a pressure campaign to maintain itself as the monopoly player in energy generation 
and control over the value chain. However, the very means of doing this through increasing 
prices coalesced stakeholders in the beginnings of a counter campaign.  
2. In 2005, ESKOM began its generation expansion programme with plans to build two very large 
new ‘clean coal’ power plants, Medupi and Kusile. However, the decision to invest in new 
capacity building was made too late. In 2007/08, South Africa faced rolling blackouts as a 
result of a decade of rapid electrification programmes and industrial growth, with no additional 
generation capacity to account for the substantial increases in demand.  
3. In 2006, NERSA, in response to pressure from ESKOM, began enacting sharp increases in 
electricity tariffs to fund the generation expansion programme. The impact of these increases 
on industries, municipalities and everyday consumers resulted in mounting pressure from 
these stakeholder groups to restrict tariff increases in the future.  
4. As the regulator, NERSA was caught in between two opposing forces: the pressure from 
ESKOM to increase revenue in order to secure energy supply in the future and the pressure 
from industry (including the highly influential EIUG) to keep prices low in order to maintain 
South Africa’s historical global competitive advantage.  
5. At the same time as the energy crisis, NERSA began developing REFIT, which garnered 
intense interest from international private sector actors seeking new investment opportunities 
in response to the global economic downturn and saturation of renewable energy markets in 
Europe.  
6. The planning of the REFIT was plagued with policy incoherency, uncertainty and confusion – 
the result of continued resistance from an incumbent regime battling to maintain power over 
energy generation. 
5.4  From Copenhagen to REFIT to RE IPPPP: 2010–2014 
The dynamics of this period are best understood in terms of a number of stages, which 
temporally overlap as well as run sequentially. The initial stages laid the foundation for 
structural change of a substantial nature later on. Hence they have to be understood 
simultaneously even if the mode of presentation requires a sub-periodisation.  
5.4.1 Stage 1 – Creating the foundation for a paradigm shift 
There is a consensus among the key informants interviewed that the major catalyst for the 
development of a renewable energy programme in South Africa was President Zuma’s 
speech at the Copenhagen Accords in December 2009. He set a voluntary target for South 
Africa to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 34 per cent by 2020, and 42 per cent by 2025. 
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Why he committed to this when it was not required and who was behind it remain unclear.43 
Indeed the motivations may well not even have been that important.  
 
Zuma’s presidency has been characterised by a lack of leadership on key issues – unless 
they affect his personal financial situation or his political survival. He says many things in 
various forums which simply pass on the wind and produce few real policy-altering ripples. 
What is clear is that the speech instigated a flurry of activity around South Africa’s renewable 
energy programme in the following year. Hence from a political economy perspective, when 
a major shift like this occurs, the key challenge is to look behind the written or spoken words 
and understand what other forces, people and institutions have taken advantage of these 
utterances in order to implement structural change. 
 
At his presidential inauguration in May 2009, Zuma announced his new cabinet which would 
have an important impact on the political economy dynamics of renewable energy. The 
previous Department of Minerals and Energy was split into a Department of Mineral 
Resources and a Department of Energy (DoE), each with its own minister. The latter utilised 
joint department resources until the end of March 2010 when the new DoE became a stand-
alone entity. The significance of this was that for the first time energy policy was not 
necessarily dominated and determined by the coal producers and ESKOM. As a key 
stakeholder, the DoE achieved a level of independence that it could utilise if it so wished.  
 
Copenhagen opened up a series of discussions and pressures over the next two years which 
laid a foundation for a structural break in the political economy of renewable energy. In the 
background, four debates were playing out (in public and in the confines of government) 
which would critically impact on the renewable energy sector’s role.  
 
The first debate, highlighting the real driver of electricity policy, surrounded the World Bank’s 
controversial decision to grant South Africa a loan for the building of Medupi and Kusile coal-
fired power stations in April 2010 (see Box 5.3). Medupi and Kusile are estimated to provide 
37 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide (MT CO2) emissions annually, increasing South Africa’s 
total contribution to climate change by 10 per cent (Greenpeace Africa 2012). Occurring in 
the midst of the development of South Africa’s first IPP renewable energy programme, the 
decision brought to light the inconsistencies in South Africa’s energy and carbon emission 
                                                        
43 From some of our interviews with government and independent experts it seems that it was a combination of the DoE and 
Foreign Affairs behind the statement. They were responding to international green pressure and pressing for further action on 
renewables. Simultaneously, South Africa received some funding at COP for green economy issues, much earmarked for 
ESKOM which was negotiating with the World Bank, making the deal more palatable. 
Box 5.3 Controversy surrounding the World Bank loan 
 
In the midst of intense international debate and outcry, the World Bank approved a US$3bn loan 
for Medupi on 8 April 2010. Civil society groups and global NGOs arguing against the loan called 
on the UK and the US to withhold support for the loan on the grounds that coal should only be 
used as an option of last resort. Consequently a smaller loan of US$260m for the Sere Wind Farm 
and Upington Solar Power Plant was tacked onto the World Bank Medupi loan. 
 
Further complicating the World Bank’s decision was the controversy surrounding the ANC’s 
investment arm Chancellor House’s 25 per cent stake in Hitachi Power Africa, a Japanese firm 
awarded an R40bn contract in 2007 to install boilers in Medupi and Kusile. The ANC later sold 
their stake in March 2014 for an undisclosed amount. In 2012, it was revealed that Chancellor 
House also has a 10 per cent stake in Bateman Africa, an engineering company that received a 
R2bn contract in 2010 for materials handling at Kusile. Medupi was supposed to be the first to 
come on line in mid-2013, but after frequent delays and postponements, Medupi has yet to be 
synchronised to the grid. 
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reduction policies and emphasised that the policy was driven more by the need for securing 
electricity supply than mitigating climate change.  
 
The second debate was focused on the renewable energy policy and was to have a 
substantial impact despite climate change mitigation not being the driver of energy policy. 
This debate was over whether or not a feed-in tariff system was appropriate for South 
Africa’s energy sector. NERSA, foreign donors and the private sector all backed a feed-in 
tariff system. However, the DoE stood in opposition, arguing that a bidding system would 
promote greater competition and lower energy prices.  
 
The third debate focused on the legality of the REFIT policy itself and whether it contravened 
the constitution, public procurement regulations and provisions of competition regulation. The 
constitution stated that organs of the state must purchase goods or services in a fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective manner. When the process was 
deemed to be non-competitive and prohibited by the government’s public procurement 
regulations the writing was on the wall for REFIT.  
 
Zuma’s seemingly throwaway lines at Copenhagen also had the unintended consequence of 
opening up a fourth debate within government – in the Treasury itself and within an inter-
ministerial committee on energy. Following Copenhagen, the DEA wanted a turn towards 
green energy in line with global trends, and hence was pushing for taking IPPs seriously. The 
DoE was receptive but, lacking a clear enough plan of its own, was not ready. The Treasury 
was concerned about the economic costs of the electricity supply and pricing crisis and 
ESKOM’s power within the value chain to hold the economy to ransom. Consequently, with 
the backing of the Treasury Minister and in cooperation with the new DoE, it was keen to 
explore other alternatives of electricity supply as well as mechanisms to competitively drive 
down its price. Their position was summed up as ‘let’s access clean tech funds and do IPPs 
and green together’.44  
 
Zuma’s promise at the Copenhagen Accords placed added pressure on the success of a 
renewable energy programme. There was also international pressure coming from the 
financial and technical assistance from foreign multilateral and bilateral donors – Dutch and 
German donors, the World Bank, and other development finance institutions – who played a 
large role in the research and project development inputs that informed the policymaking 
process.  
 
Additional pressure also came from the private sector. REFIT and the aftermath of 
Copenhagen garnered an impressive amount of attention from international solar and wind 
companies who began setting up offices in Cape Town in the early stages of the REFIT 
development process. These project developers had spent a substantial amount of time and 
money preparing projects for an IPP procurement process. The amount of private finance 
and technical experience that these companies offered became too large, and too public, to 
turn down. 
5.4.2 Confusion surrounding REFIT 
Since NERSA began the design of the REFIT programme in 2006/07, the project had been 
beset with issues surrounding the creation of an IPP procurement system within the context 
of an existing policy and institutional framework that, in itself, was unclear and highly 
contested. While progress was sluggish at first, Zuma’s speech provided the impetus for the 
REFIT programme to move rapidly forward. The chain of events that transpired (described 
below) under REFIT from 2009 to 2011 lead one to conclude that the policymaking process 
outpaced the technical and institutional inputs necessary for such a programme to succeed. 
                                                        
44 Interview, government official in Treasury and DoE. 
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This added further confusion (and concerned potential private investors who had already 
begun investing large sums of money in preparing projects) to an already complex process. 
 
In March 2009, NERSA had approved REFIT’s Phase 1, which included a set of tariffs 
covering four technologies: wind, small hydro, landfill gas and CSP. In November 2009, 
NERSA approved another set of tariffs under REFIT’s Phase 2 for six additional 
technologies, including biogas, biomass and PV. However, the tariffs were released prior to 
any indication as to the nature of the procurement process, the licensing process, or who 
would even qualify for the tariffs.  
 
In March 2010, NERSA released the REFIT selection criteria for public comment. This 
process took over a year, with some revisions to the structure. With the selection criteria still 
under fierce public debate, the DoE announced a ‘request for information’ for potential 
private developers for the REFIT procurement process in September 2010. 
 
Finally, to add even further uncertainty and frustration to the REFIT process, NERSA 
released a consultation paper in March 2011 – months before the REFIT programme was 
intended to launch – that proposed a set of reduced tariffs for IPP generation, with some 
reduced as much as 40 per cent. This confused and angered IPP developers who had 
planned projects with the original tariffs in mind and had invested millions of dollars in 
preparing their projects for the selection process. The South African Wind Energy 
Association (SAWEA) calculated that wind project developers alone invested more than 
US$50m in preparation for REFIT (Naidoo 2011). 
 
The most significant turn of events occurred in November 2010 when the new DoE started 
flexing its muscles. It initiated a process of revising the Regulations on New Generation for 
the procurement of new IPP generation capacity with input from foreign consultants (Danish 
and German).45 The revised regulations, which came into effect in May 2011, contained a 
number of changes that effectively transferred powers that used to reside within NERSA and 
ESKOM’s mandate to the DoE (with the backing of the National Treasury). Most significantly, 
the selection of the REFIT IPPs was taken out of ESKOM’s control. Furthermore, NERSA’s 
power to formulate the power purchase agreement (PPA) and selection criteria was 
removed. Finally, these regulations made it possible for the Minister of Energy to instruct 
ESKOM to buy power from an IPP. Previously ESKOM was not obliged to do so. Hence, 
formally speaking, it had not needed to block an IPP. Given that it controlled the transmission 
link which governed supply generation entry in the value chain, it could simply wait and do 
nothing, which left the IPP hanging out to dry. At a legislative stroke these revised 
regulations placed the REFIT programme under the control of the DoE, emasculated 
NERSA, and isolated ESKOM and the DPE in respect of renewable energy. 
5.4.3 The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 
Coinciding with the Copenhagen Accords, in what was surely a strategic move during a time 
of international scrutiny, the DoE published its first Integrated Resource Plan (IRP 1). The 
aim of the IRP is to forecast energy demand levels for a 20-year period and determine the 
appropriate energy mix in order to meet those levels of demand in the future. The first IRP, 
published as an interim five-year plan – a mere three pages long – was flawed and heavily 
criticised. A revision began immediately in January 2010 to dramatically expand the rushed 
IRP 1.  
 
In May 2011, IRP 2010 was approved, establishing the country’s energy mix for the next 20 
years. The plan added 56,539MW which more than doubled capacity to 89,532MW by 2030. 
It also added new capacity to come from a variety of sources. Coal was still to remain 
                                                        
45 Back in August 2009, the new DoE had gazetted the Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity (under the 2006 
ERA) to establish rules and guidelines for the procurement of new IPP generation capacity. 
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dominant with 29 per cent (16,383MW) of the new capacity added coming from this 
traditional source.46 However, the structural changes to note were significant allocations for 
renewables in this new capacity. Renewables comprised 38 .1 per cent (21,534 MW) of the 
new capacity to be added – comprising 16.3 per cent (9,200MW) for wind, 14.9 per cent 
(8,400MW) for photovoltaic solar (PV), 4.6 per cent (2,609MW) for imported hydropower, and 
2.1 per cent (1,200MW) for concentrated solar power (CSP). As a result, of the total 
expected capacity in 2030, coal would still remain the dominant form of supply at 45.9 per 
cent, but renewables from wind, solar and CSP would make up 21 per cent of total capacity. 
This was hence hailed as a much needed diversification away from coal-based electricity 
generation. The plan, however, also made a major commitment to expand nuclear capacity 
in the additional energy mix – 9,600MW was to be added (17 per cent of the additional 
capacity) so that by 2030 nuclear would constitute 10 per cent of total electricity capacity 
(DoE 2011a).47  
 
IRP 2010 was created in part by an interdepartmental ‘technical advisory group’ established 
to provide the technical inputs (i.e. model forecasting for supply and demand projections) 
necessary for the plan. The minutes of the meetings still remain confidential. Additionally, all 
members signed confidentiality agreements with the DoE. The advisory group was largely 
comprised of representatives from ESKOM, the DoE, the coal industry, and the Energy 
Intensive Users Group (EIUG) – all powerful actors who all have a stake in maintaining a 
coal-based energy regime. There was no one from the renewable private sector.48    
 
Baker et al. (2014) (and others) have made the composition of the technical advisory group a 
focal point. Criticisms of the lack of representivity of this committee are justified but they do 
not provide an explanation of the dynamics underlying renewable energy decisions. The 
reason is that the IRP 2010 has since been updated and a different (even less 
representative) process followed – ironically, however, with a much better renewables 
outcome. Clearly the renewables trajectory needs to be analysed in terms of other forces 
operating in the background. 
5.4.4 Stage 2 – A new renewable energy programme (RE IPPPP) and a 
new coalition 
Arising from the meetings within the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy to discuss South 
Africa’s energy crisis and ESKOM’s dire financial situation, in 2010 the Minister of Finance 
asked a small group within the Treasury’s PPP Unit to identify the barriers to private sector 
entry into the energy sector and to start exploring ways to remove those barriers. This group, 
headed by Karen Breytenbach, took this window – what was essentially intended to be an 
information gathering exercise – as an opportunity to bring IPPs back to the forefront of the 
discussion surrounding solutions to South Africa’s energy mix. Coincidentally, but to its 
advantage, this window occurred when pressure was already building for South Africa’s 
scheduled hosting in Durban of COP17 in 2011. Capitalising on the fact that South Africa 
needed a tangible success to present to the international community at COP17, this new 
unit, in coordination with the deputy director general of the DoE, decided that the path of 
least resistance towards integrating IPPs into the energy mix would be in going ‘green’.49  
 
Originally when the PPP Unit members were tasked with looking into the barriers to IPP 
electricity generation, they were busy working on a model to incorporate IPPs into the health 
insurance and hospital management market using funding from the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA). Since there was no funding available to hire external consultants to 
review the various options, the DBSA was asked to apply that model to renewable energy 
                                                        
46 GHG emissions will increase from 237 to 272MT CO2 in 2030 (Winkler et al. 2011). 
47 The rationale for nuclear was not only stability of supply but also to meet the GHG mitigation goals. 
48 There was one academic environmental expert but he was never informed of any meetings. 
49 Interview, Karen Breytenbach (Treasury/DoE). 
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IPPs. When the DBSA signed on, this secured enough financial support to bring in a group of 
highly skilled international consultants to begin working on the project. This solidified the 
beginning of a new coalition, a three-way partnership with the Treasury and the DoE, backed 
by the powerful Minister of Planning in the Presidency who had been the previous Minister of 
Finance, and coalescing in this unit, which existed in the interstices of departmental formality.  
 
In essence, due to the relatively high capacity of its personnel and their ability to make 
funding decisions on behalf of the programme, the National Treasury took advantage of the 
political space that was created. This was (1) the pressure to showcase South Africa on the 
international stage; (2) moving to act on the electricity crisis; and (3) the inability of ESKOM 
to meet both the financial demands and time demands to generate the capacity that was 
immediately required for energy security.  
 
This small unit, headed by Breytenbach, moved out of the Treasury building and found 
offices adjacent to the DoE. It was, formally speaking, accountable to the Treasury and 
always ensured it had high level political and bureaucratic backing from within it, but through 
this move and its informal status was able to operate relatively independently of the 
Treasury. The important thing is that it was perceived as not being an arm of the Treasury 
due to the fact that it was procuring energy on behalf of the DoE. This was a factor that was 
‘absolutely essential to the success of the programme’.50 They had at their disposal a small 
team of people from both ministries as well as a highly experienced group of international 
consultants. They were described as ‘lean, mean and flexible’. As Breytenbach explained: 
‘We were not the Treasury, we were not the DoE, we were this partnership mix which speaks 
to cooperative governance. We were a knitted-together coalition of departments’. This 
perception was practically reinforced, and the coalition strengthened, by always presenting 
its findings, recommendations, proposals, and activities through the DoE management 
structure, rather than Treasury. The DoE was publicly seen to be driving the renewable 
energy processes and outcomes brought about by this unit.  
 
By this stage the debate had already started contrasting the appropriateness of a feed-in 
tariff over a bidding process. This unit was then tasked with designing an IPP programme 
within the context of South Africa’s legal environment. Commissioned consultants reported 
that REFIT did not comply with the legal requirements under South Africa’s public 
procurement policy. REFIT, as it was designed, even with the reduced tariffs released in 
March 2011, did not meet those requirements. This sparked tension with NERSA (and 
ESKOM) which had built its framework around the premise of feed-in tariffs; a model that 
was used by countries at the forefront of renewable energy policy around the world. Not only 
did the DoE question the programme’s legality, but also the ability of NERSA to act as both a 
regulator and overseer of the IPP programme. Ultimately, the DoE used the IPP procurement 
regulations under Section 4 (Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity) of the 
Electricity Regulations Act, 2006, to rule that IPPs would not be selected by NERSA. It also 
started to attack the highly vertically integrated nature of the electricity value chain. The DoE 
would now be the procurer of new IPP capacity and ESKOM would be the sole buyer.  
 
REFIT (and NERSA/ESKOM control over it) was effectively dead and buried. In July, the 
DoE launched the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 
Programme (RE IPPPP), a competitive bidding programme, and formally announced the 
abandonment of REFIT in August 2011. A month after its launch the DoE issued a Request 
for Proposals for RE IPPPP. The RE IPPPP was designed to procure the 3,725MW of new 
renewable energy generation allocated in the IRP 2010 according to the following allotment 
for each technology: 1,850MW for wind-generated power; 200MW for concentrated solar 
power (CSP); 1,450MW for solar photovoltaic power (PV); 12.5MW for biomass and biogas 
                                                        
50 Interview, Karen Breytenbach (Treasury/DoE). 
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power; 25MW for landfill gas power; 75MW for hydroelectric power; and 100MW for small-
scale IPP projects of less than 5MW.  
 
This unit with no official name but which we shall call the ‘IPP Unit’ was then faced with the 
decision of how much electricity would be procured and over what period of time. According 
to the recently released IRP, a total of 3,725MW of renewable energy was initially allotted for 
new grid-connected energy capacity. With the tacit backing of key actors in the various 
coalition departments, the unit proposed that the Minister of Energy sign off on the allocation 
of all 3,725MW under the bidding programme. The decision to allocate smaller amounts 
through five windows was then proposed with the following motivation. First, it allowed 
potential project developers time to prepare their bids, creating a broader scope for 
participation. Secondly, multiple bidding windows would allow for increased competition 
between developers in order to drive the price down. Most significantly, the segmented 
allocation also gave ample opportunities for ‘learning by doing’, and ensured that the process 
would remain dynamic and open to improvements. This decision proved to be fundamental to 
RE IPPPP’s eventual success.  
 
Another factor in the IPP Unit’s success was systematically widening the coalition of support 
– gaining approval from the DEA; Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (DAFF); 
the Department of Water Affairs (DWA); and the DTI. The DEA was on board with the 
programme from the beginning, but was concerned about the capacity required to actually 
deal with the volume of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) that it would require. In 
the end, the department gave its full support and pushed through the workload with the 
capacity they had. The DAFF and DWA had concerns over the land and water use that the 
IPP projects would require, resources that could otherwise be used for agricultural 
production. In order to overcome this obstacle, the IPP Unit worked with those ministries to 
make joint decisions on land allocations that were outlined in the procurement documents.  
 
The final department to bring on board was the DTI. Job creation and new industrial 
development needed to be a key aspect of the bidding programme in order to gain 
widespread support within not only government, but organised labour and the consumer 
base as a whole. Historically, the discussion surrounding the entrance of renewable energy 
technologies in the South African energy mix elicited many serious concerns from industry 
and labour:  
 
 The sector would mostly be comprised of international firms. 
 Few jobs would be created, while jobs in the mining sectors would be eroded. 
 The few jobs created would cater towards highly skilled workers.  
 Increases in electricity prices would cause energy-intense sectors to cut jobs to lower 
production costs.  
 Communities affected by new infrastructure on their land would not reap any benefit 
from the projects. 
 
In order to get DTI support, the programme needed to have a built-in local content 
requirement and development projects for the communities that the construction of these 
wind and solar farms would be directly affecting.  
 
The South African Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) dictates that 
tenders will be selected on a 90/10 preference point system. A maximum 90 points are 
determined by price and 10 points are allocated for a specific set of development-based 
criteria. The IPP Unit requested an exception and were granted a 70/30 preference point 
system (See Box 5.4 for RE IPPPP’s selection criteria). The 30 points would place a heavy 
burden on the private sector, risking decreased interest in the programme and, therefore, a 
decrease in the amount of competition necessary to ensure lower prices. However, the IPP 
Unit deemed this risk necessary to ease the tension between the DoE and National 
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Treasury’s energy security aims and DTI’s developmental objectives, as well as to assuage 
the concerns of industry and labour.  
 
 
 
The design of the programme differed from international norms in another very important 
aspect. Unlike other first movers in Europe, South Africa was primarily driven by the urgent 
need for generation capacity – environmental concerns played a very small role in the actual 
motivations behind the renewable energy programme (although outwardly the rhetoric 
surrounding RE IPPPP may have elevated the importance of the environmental motive). Due 
to the energy crisis in South Africa at the time, it was essential that the projects selected 
through the bidding windows be successful; therefore, RE IPPPP required that projects reach 
full financial close within six months of being selected as a preferred bidder. This 
requirement, although placing heavy burdens on the private sector and the banking system, 
was also necessary due to the financial constraints on the programme. It was feared that the 
National Treasury would be forced to pull its support if the projects were not financially viable 
and give ESKOM ample ammunition to block the programme from advancing. In August 
2011, the DoE held a bidders’ conference. More than 1,000 people attended, far surpassing 
expectations for the amount of interest in the programme.  
 
After an evaluation of the first window, it was clear that the electricity prices of the selected 
projects were too high. At this point, the IPP Unit faced the decision of whether to proceed 
with the process. As one interviewee put it, ‘We were faced with the question of do we 
announce or don’t we announce the preferred bidders?’. However, the IPP Unit got the go-
ahead from high up in the Treasury. It was conceded that the prices were too high, but that 
South Africa ‘must show the world that we are serious, that will be the impetus’. It was better 
to demonstrate to the international community that the South African renewable energy 
policy environment was stable, and hence worth investing in.51 
 
The tactic worked. Prices decreased by 22 per cent for wind and 40 per cent for solar PV 
between the first and second window, and then again by 27 per cent and 46 per cent 
                                                        
51 Interview, Treasury official. 
Box 5.4  RE IPPPP selection criteria  
 
Bids were evaluated based on two components: price (70 per cent weight) and economic 
development (30 per cent weight), with a total of 100 points.  
 
Price criteria: The bidder provides the consumer price index (CPI)-linked price, an equivalent 
annual tariff (EAT) is calculated based on a formula, and that EAT is then compared to the 
lowest EAT for the same technology category.  
 
Economic development criteria: The score for economic development criteria is based on 
the following categories, each with separate weightings:  
 
 Job creation (25 per cent)  
 Local content (25 per cent)  
 Ownership (15 per cent)  
 Management control (5 per cent)  
 Preferential procurement (10 per cent) 
 Enterprise development (5 per cent)  
 Socioeconomic development (15 per cent)  
 
Points are awarded for each of the separate categories based on scoring between a threshold 
level (minimum of zero points) and a target level (maximum of ten points). These thresholds 
and target levels were designed to change for each bidding window with the aim of increasing 
the economic development requirements for bidders as the RE IPPPP process progressed. 
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respectively. Over the entire three bidding windows the prices dropped dramatically: for wind 
a reduction of 43 per cent, and for solar PV a massive 68 per cent (Table 5.1). The            
RE IPPPP system was clearly successful in terms of the principal issue on which had been 
criticised. 
Table 5.1 RE IPPPP average bid prices (2011 prices in SAc/kW)  
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Wind 114.3 89.7 65.6 
Reduction from previous round  -21.5% -26.9% 
Total reduction from round 1   -42.6% 
Solar PV 275.8 164.5 88.1 
Reduction from previous round  -40.4% -46.4% 
Total reduction from round 1   -68.1% 
Concentrated solar power 268.6 251.2 146.0* 
Reduction from previous round  -6.5% 41.9% 
Total reduction from round 1   -45.6% 
Source: Eberhard et al. (2014). 
 
The process proved to be sufficiently reliable and sound to warrant increased interest in      
RE IPPPP from international project developers. Competition between IPP bidders was also 
increased and ‘was no doubt the main driver for prices falling’ (Eberhard et al. 2014: 18). 
Over the period of the RE IPPPP process (i.e. encompassing competitive bids 1, 2 and 3) 
there has been a steady increase of interest from investors in bid applications and a flow of 
successful bids granted despite a more stringent process from one window to the next. In the 
first round there were 54 bids submitted with 28 granted, in the second 79 bids submitted 
and 19 granted, and in the third round 93 bids submitted and 17 preferred bidders granted. In 
total 64 bids were selected over the three windows. From the perspective of the Treasury 
and the DoE, attracting FDI through the RE IPPPP has also been a major investment 
success story. In total it has attracted over R120bn or US$14bn into renewable energy 
projects (ibid.).  
 
The energy crisis had an ironic outcome. It strengthened ESKOM’s hand in terms of building 
new coal-based power generation, but simultaneously provided the opportunity for a new 
coalition for change to develop. The context of a crisis provided the impetus for RE IPPPP to 
advance quickly and weakened the position of dissenting opinion. This coalition garnered 
sufficient influence to radically shift the balance of power within government and create a 
structural break around renewable energy generation. ‘Redesigning the REFIT process 
brought in international interest. There were too many vested interests involved to kill it’.52 
Moreover, the scale and scope of the private sector involvement was ‘a class interest of a 
serious note… (and) changed the nature of the game’.53 
                                                        
52 Interview, Belynda Petrie (independent expert). 
53 Interview, Anton Eberhard (independent expert). 
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Box 5.5  Summary: from Copenhagen to REFIT to RE IPPPP: 2010–
  2014 
 
A small but influential inter-ministerial unit played a key role over this period. This IPP Unit created an 
inclusive coalition for change, through joint decision-making processes and compromises to include all 
necessary ministries. 
 
The severe nature of the electricity crisis allowed the coalition to be formed without ESKOM’s 
involvement. Energy security was a top priority for all stakeholders and it was widely believed that 
ESKOM could not adequately address the crisis on its own.  
 
This coalition allowed the IPP Unit to effectively isolate ESKOM and the DPE from the process. The 
key informants involved in the process acknowledged that ESKOM never publicly blocked any 
progress towards an IPP renewable energy programme, but rather employed a strategy of using its 
control over the value chain to delay the process and then waiting until the proposed programme 
eventually met its demise. This tactic was described by one interviewee as ‘malicious compliance – 
they always project that they are on board, they will never say that they disagree with a government 
policy, but they will do what they can to stop it’. The strategy had worked before with REFIT, which 
had been overwhelmed by policy incoherency, regulatory confusion, missed deadlines and, most 
crucially, the lack of strong stakeholder influence within government driving it. ESKOM did not believe 
that RE IPPPP would work. It thought it would follow the same trajectory as REFIT.  
 
RE IPPPP pulled in substantial vested interest from the private sector, increasing its zone of influence. 
The nature of the process involved large foreign firms investing in renewable energy generation. The 
competitive bidding process gave the banks a pre-eminent status since they carried most of the risk. 
The entry of such major players in the private sector effectively acted to change the nature of the 
game.  
 
The institutional nature of the IPP Unit was crucial. It comprised a small group of individuals that did 
not bureaucratically fall under the watch of any single department. This contributed to its success in 
being able to build a coalition of influence within government. Essentially operating as a proxy for the 
DoE, but with the tacit backing of the Treasury, without having to work within the confines of the 
department’s internal procedures, it was able to ‘fly under the radar for long enough’ to gain the 
traction necessary to ensure that the process, once moving, would not be stopped. This unit managed 
to create the joined up government that was necessary to move beyond the normal state silos that act 
to constipate and stifle intervention.   
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6 Challenges facing RE IPPPP and climate 
change policy  
 
There are a number of serious challenges facing the renewable energy sector which may 
well destabilise the coalition and produce a variety of differing outcomes. In this final section 
we consider four major problem areas which have the potential to destabilise the coalition 
and create a different trajectory: 
6.1 The institutionalisation of the IPP Unit 
The strength of the IPP Unit is simultaneously also its Achilles heel. Its perceived informal 
status, lack of a seemingly formal institutional home, and absence of direct accountability 
enabled the key members to cross departmental boundaries and construct a necessary 
coalition. It floated between departments when this was appropriate, but at other times when 
something else was required was able to pin itself firmly under the cover of either the DoE or 
Treasury. It could draw on the substantial backing and power of the Treasury standing in its 
shadows, but also give credit to the DoE for any of its successes. Its ad hoc status meant 
that it was accountable to no one and yet willingly answerable to everyone.  
 
As long as the key personnel acted within broad government parameters, they could avoid 
the stultifying suffocation of departmental politics and regulation. No single department had 
to take responsibility for its activities, and yet all could claim a proportional piece of the 
resulting outcomes. Its smallness – described as exhibiting ‘lean-and-meanness’ by 
interviewees – enabled it to maintain the necessary flexibility to be proactive, respond 
quickly, and interact effectively in bringing business and government together. And its 
flexibility meant it could attract the kind of staff who were decidedly not regulation-governed 
government bureaucrats simply occupying seats rather than intent on going places. The link 
to the DBSA created funding flexibility to access high-level consulting services and utilise 
expert personnel within the unit. Shifting this funding role to the DBSA meant that 
cumbersome government tendering regulations could be sidestepped and slow payment 
procedures avoided.  
 
Yet this is also the body’s weakness. Its very success means that there are strong pressures 
for it to formalise and become a discernible government unit (Eberhard et al. 2014). But this 
formalisation process is not without significant problems. Where would such a formal unit 
institutionally sit? How could it be placed in a single government department and still play the 
linkage role between departments? How would it remain flexible if it was formally 
accountable to the rigid hierarchies of departmental regulation? Furthermore, success 
breeds growth and it is unlikely that the ‘Unit’ will be able to remain small and still handle the 
increasing workload. It will have to grow, and growth will bring an increase in the sheer 
workload, put increasing strain on the existing personnel and hence require a substantial 
change in the staff complement. Finally, there is the issue of the expansion in its scope, 
which will increase pressure for institutional formalisation. The irony is that the success of the 
renewables platform will create demands for a similar process to be followed in respect of 
future private sector-based gas and coal electricity generation, as well as drawing on co-
generation activities in the existing large business enterprises.  
 
This increase in scale and scope can only increase pressure for the formalisation of the ‘Unit’ 
and the growth and complexity of its institutional structures. Such demands will come from 
friend and foe alike, for wholly opposite reasons and intentions. Those who are driving an 
agenda for an expansion of the competitive, flexible renewable energy programme will argue 
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for formalisation as a means of institutionally firewalling it as a means of protection. Likewise 
those actors, agencies, and institutions wishing to retain ESKOM and DPE control over the 
major links in the electricity value chain, defend the status quo, oppose the structural shift to 
a private sector renewable energy drive and widen the chink for nuclear energy generation 
may see the formalisation of the unit as a means to institutionally hobble its activities, bring it 
under a single department’s control, and in the process destabilise the current coalition.  
 
One solution would be to formalise the unit, but take it out of the formal political terrain of any 
single department. It could instead be placed in the office of the Presidency. However, the 
current president has too many question marks over his lack of independence to make this a 
viable solution. 
6.2 Structural shifts in investment and decreasing competition 
The first couple of phases resulted in project-funded bids rather than corporate-funded bids. 
They were based on bank funding using the project assets to back the loans. This formula 
placed all the risk (around 80 per cent) on the banks which meant that they imposed 
stringent governance requirements on a project bid and its operations: fixed term, fixed 
performance and upfront penalty. As a result all projects have been on time and on, or under, 
budget. The result has been a highly successful competitive bidding process, with strict 
financial and operational controls exhibited and tariff prices below the feed-in tariffs initially 
proposed. Indeed, prices have been on a downward trend.  
 
This bank-backed process has been complicated and required intensive upfront regulatory 
procedures, but it has maintained strict fiduciary responsibility and as a consequence has 
been clean. There has been no space for offering bribes and the ability to hide corruption in 
the process has been extremely limited.  
   
A new trend emerging, as the pressure to lower tariff prices in the third round competitive 
bidding process increases, is investment shifting away from project/bank guarantees to 
corporate guarantees. Large foreign utilities, having seen the success of the South African 
competitive bidding process as compared to other country programmes, are preparing their 
proposal bids using their own corporate financial security to back their bids. They may 
borrow money from the banks but it is on the basis of their corporate balance sheet and not a 
project guarantee. This removes the banks from the focal point of the risk and concentrates it 
in the foreign large corporation/utility which is able to absorb or cut some of the costs and 
thereby come in with much lower pricing.  
 
In the first two rounds 45 out of 47 projects (96 per cent) were bank financed. However, by 
the third round this had dropped to only 11 out of 17 (65 per cent). The remaining six were 
corporate finance by a large European utility, demonstrating a structural shift away from 
project bank financing to large foreign corporate financing (Eberhard et al. 2014). In the 
fourth round it is expected by some commentators that all the upcoming bids will be won by a 
couple of foreign corporate utilities. Hence this structural shift towards corporate-financed 
bids is expected to accelerate in coming rounds. The banks will no longer be in the market. 
Nor will the small local developers be in the market because they will not be able to compete 
on price. The result will be that instead of the renewable wind energy market being 
fragmented among a large number of players it will become highly concentrated in the hands 
of a few large corporate utilities backing the various operational IPPs.  
 
This throws up a major challenge for the coalition-backing IPPs. On the one hand it will 
demonstrate the success of the competitive bidding programme, make it administratively 
easier to deal with in terms of processing and allocating bids, and vindicate the coalition 
headed by the DoE and Treasury. However, it does not necessarily satisfy the DTI industrial 
diversification interest in spreading local ownership and creating local content, and is a 
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potential threat to maintaining that ministry’s active support. How this plays out in terms of 
coalition stability is more complex, for it all depends on how government responds to the key 
economic development component enshrined in the competitive bidding process. This holds 
the possibility of a resolution of this challenge. 
6.3 RE IPPPP economic development requirements   
The economic development requirements that a bidder has to fulfil are an important aspect 
maintaining the current coalition of stakeholder support for the RE IPPPP. These economic 
development requirements span two major issues: facilitating local economic activity and 
meeting social development needs. The former revolves around stimulating local ownership 
and local content of inputs, while the latter is concerned with distributing some gains to local 
communities in the vicinity of the IPP. Bids are judged in terms of two sets of issues: price 
comprising 70 per cent and development comprising 30 per cent of the score.  
 
The latter development requirements lock in backing to the RE IPPPP from other arms of 
government concerned with stimulating local business involvement, local labour utilisation 
and social development. Outside of government they also create support for the RE IPPPP 
from different segments of civil society across the class spectrum. They encompass those 
segments concerned with distributing the gains to poorer local communities in various direct 
and indirect forms, as well as at the opposite end of the social class spectrum, the new black 
middle class who have new opportunities to be black economic empowerment (BEE) 
beneficiaries. Finally, increasing local economic development favours future local 
employment and this brings potential support from the labour movement.54  
 
Although these two elements of economic and social development are bundled up together 
under one heading in the bidding process, they are analytically distinguishable and their 
challenges should be separately discussed.  
6.3.1 Local economic development  
A consequence of the project-financed modality has been that it has tended to block local 
new IPPs or project management firms from entering the sector since the banks have gone 
with least risky options. However, this has not stopped IPPs using BEE equity investment to 
make up for local investment. These black empowerment deals have either involved 
politically connected individuals or community trusts. This has consolidated an important 
class segment of the citizenry behind the model.  
 
A positive outcome has been the building of local managerial capacity in running the 
projects. Initially, local entrepreneurs were simply engaging in land speculation, buying 
properties that they were either tipped off about or that looked likely for IPP wind farm 
development. They then sold this to the bidder, with no long-term economic spin-off. Then, 
when this form of unproductive and parasitic tenderpreneurship was frowned on by 
government, these local investors realised that they were more attractive to foreign capital 
through combining land with project development expertise – hence adopting a longer-term 
perspective through building productive development capacity. 
 
However, we have not seen an increase in domestic industrial content and hence an 
increase in the number of locally based manufacturing firms spun off from this sector. These 
local content requirements were principally met through procuring a variety of non-critical 
inputs and services which did little to foster new trajectories of domestic industrialisation. 
Foreign-based IPPs used local cement and steel for construction of the plant, opened up 
                                                        
54 However, if it means a reduction in ESKOM’s reach and scope then those particular unions organising the parastatal face a 
potential loss in membership which they have to balance against broader development objectives.  
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new administration offices in South Africa and added a small number to local employment 
figures, satisfied BEE requirements and used some local project management professional 
services. The impact on more technology-intensive component activities requiring 
manufacturing conversion processes (blades, turbine components, gear boxes, etc.) has 
thus far been insignificant. There is a reason for this. The economies of demand are too 
small and fragmented. This is not only a size issue. It is related to the competitive bidding 
process itself, which has thus far tended to fragment the market into a number of dispersed 
bids. These bidders cannot commit to meaningfully stimulate local manufacturing in their 
proposals since they first have to win the bid. The result of this fragmentation process and 
small market is that local production cannot reach sufficient economies of scale to be 
reasonably competitive. Hence this undermines the stated local content/ownership objectives 
of the DTI’s support within the renewables coalition.  
 
Ironically, the structural shift towards corporate financing, a trend we are already seeing and 
which is likely to escalate, has the possibility of providing an opportunity to increase local 
content. This shift will result in greater concentration of large foreign corporates or utilities in 
the IPP sector. Concentration has the potential to overcome the lack of economies of 
demand and of scale holding back local production of more technically demanding 
components for renewable energy wind generation operations. It will concentrate buying 
power and potentially allow utility corporates to procure locally on a greater scale. However, 
this will not necessarily happen in and of itself as a natural tendency arising from increased 
economies of demand. It is only likely to do so if pushed by appropriate government policy in 
this direction. The corporate utilities, if left alone to their established procurement devices, 
may well prefer to import all components from their home base as the least risky option. 
Following this trajectory will increase tensions within the renewables coalition as local 
content and local ownership fails, and it will play into the hands of those wishing to redirect 
electricity generation away from private sector renewables.  
 
Concentration therefore contains a potential threat. But it also contains a tangible opportunity 
if government changes the regulatory bidding rules to take advantage of this situation and 
utilise it to nudge IPPs towards increased local procurement. For example, government could 
institute a policy requiring greater and additional economic development commitments for 
any parties that win more than a certain number of projects (e.g. two-thirds). This will force 
these large utilities to take advantage of their economies of demand and concentrate 
attention on the supply side to achieve the necessary economies of scale. These large 
foreign utilities are not in the business of manufacturing such componentry. But they do have 
strong relationships with established suppliers in their home regions or elsewhere in the 
world and could be demanding that these companies set up shop in South Africa to provide 
them with the necessary supply. This could be facilitated by government policy incentivising 
the process. There is therefore no reason why ‘follower sourcing’, as happens in the 
automotive industry, should not become the basis for deepening local content on the back of 
this process of concentration of IPP ownership. 
6.3.2 Facilitating social development 
The social development requirement requires that each successful IPP project invests 1 per 
cent of revenues (often through a community trust) in some form of local development. 
These local development initiatives within adjacent communities are unspecified. They can 
range from building a local school, creating bursary funds, setting up a library, installing solar 
geysers, etc. Basically, the requirement is well intentioned but ill thought out. There are a 
number of problems contained in the requirement.  
 
Firstly, it requires IPP technically oriented companies who know nothing about undertaking 
major corporate social responsibility programmes to design effective social development 
programmes which they have no experience in undertaking. Hence these companies 
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basically regard it as a penalty tax and seek a way of paying it off. If a company does not 
have the capacity, knowledge or desire to engage itself, it will give money to a third party to 
do the job, with or without specific guidelines. This results in the emergence of supposed 
‘specialists’ setting themselves up and undertaking to spend the money for the companies in 
various disadvantaged geographical areas. The more innovative sponsors try to set up local 
businesses, and then earn a return on their operations. The rest? Who knows, given the 
deficiency in monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The second problem with the scheme is that it requires these successful bidders to throw 
large sums of money at local communities who lack the structures to absorb them and 
ensure proper governance mechanisms. It may work in some well-organised communities 
but in most cases it leads to confusion and disappointment as local communities do not 
understand the benefits they are supposed to be reaping, and if they do then they do not 
understand why these should take time to come to fruition. In any case most poor 
communities do not have the capacity to set up and manage effective community trusts. 
Unlike the competitive bidding process, which is clean, this social development requirement 
is a recipe for corruption. In most communities with no clear accountability structures it 
encourages a host of backhander payments to any local powerful person who can make the 
demand and threaten the company with community action. It also provides an open invitation 
for local municipalities to get involved and help themselves to available cash from these 
community trusts for other legitimate and illegitimate activities.  
 
Thirdly, this system requires effective monitoring over the lifespan of the project. Yet there 
are no regulatory mechanisms in place to ensure this has to happen. Indeed, the DoE could 
not do this without a major expansion in its capacity. Take, for example, the problem of 
monitoring the programme effectively given expanding scale with each successful round. 
There are already 64 separate IPP contracts. Each project has an expected lifespan of 20 
years and involves numerous and highly varied economic development targets. Each is also 
required to report performance on a quarterly basis, which is supposed to reflect in 
performance credits or deductions. The DoE simply does not have the staff capacity nor 
ongoing budget allocation to undertake the required performance monitoring and evaluation 
costs. Hence ‘it is difficult to see how this monitoring work can be sustained at an appropriate 
level’ (Eberhard et al. 2014). 
 
One way for the DoE to limit the confusion, frustration, and corruption arising from this 
process, with its attendant possibility of creating fissures in the renewable energy programme 
from social partners, is for the DoE to regulate the scope of development investment required 
and provide greater policy direction. It could limit the variety of acceptable investments, link 
them to renewable energy projects so as to make the relationship to wind farms clearer, and 
hence specify what would be acceptable expenditure. For example, requiring the 
development expenditure to fit all houses in the local community with solar geysers; or to set 
up local factories to build solar water heaters and PV panels for sale nationally. Government 
has been loath to do this as it would prefer to create a buffer between itself and these 
development projects, since it recognises that it lacks the necessary capacity to manage 
them. Hence it stresses the need to create an open innovative window for the private sector 
to meet its social commitment. The IPP investors would prefer government regulation as it 
would provide guidance, take the heat off them, limit corruption and allow them to redirect 
community complaints, enquiries and issues to appropriate government channels.  
6.4 ESKOM’s transmission and distribution networks and IPP 
connectivity  
The transmission/distribution backbone operates on the relationship between high voltage 
(400kVA) and low voltage (132kVA) delivery of electricity once it has been generated. The 
transmission backbone transmits electricity across the country in high voltage form. From this 
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backbone it is supplied to regional or municipal distribution loops (akin to an arm, carrying on 
the skeletal analogy) in a low voltage form, who then deliver it onto individual consumers in 
lower voltage distribution (around 60kVA) fingers. Although ESKOM itself refers to the 
process of lower voltage delivery to municipal/regional as its own form of distribution, for 
ease of analysis we have used transmission to encompass both high and low voltage (132–
400kVA) and distribution to refer to lower voltage delivery to individual residential and 
business consumers.  
 
Individual consumers are simply worried about the cost of connecting to the fingers (a basic 
connection at a standardised cost), whereas ESKOM has to be concerned about a number of 
transmission/distribution connection variables: the cost of connecting to the arm, how to 
connect arms to fingers, where to connect to the fingers, how to balance the system load 
between arms and fingers, how to maintain differential amounts of electricity in the system 
depending on varying demand in the day, where and how to connect feed-in IPPs into the 
transmission system and maintain the load balance and the overall cost structure. Simply 
put, from an input connection perspective a geographical area may be the best location for 
wind or solar renewable energy, but on the current configuration it may not be the best place 
from ESKOM’s point of view to connect supply generated into the transmission backbone. If 
the feed-in and feed-out loads are in the wrong places then new connection stations have to 
be constructed by ESKOM. This takes time as ESKOM has an incredibly bureaucratic mode 
of decision-making and implementation is seldom anywhere near scheduled time frames,55 
imposes additional costs, and creates system constraints on ESKOM’s operations.  
 
These are recognisable real problems and constraints. They are rooted in genuine structural 
issues and ESKOM uses them effectively when arguing its case. But they are not pre-given. 
Different corporate policy, receptivity to including renewables, genuine acceptance that IPPs 
are an integral part of the future, genuine consultative procedures, etc. on the corporation’s 
part, all would produce differential outcomes.  
 
The problem arises not simply from neutral structural constraints but is integral to the 
exercise of value chain governance. It is created and feeds off ESKOM’s monopoly position 
in control of the entire value chain, and it is magnified by the fact that supply generation ties 
up around 60 per cent of turnover in the chain. Given this structural position of supply in the 
system, and the fact that the managers of ESKOM tend to come from electricity power 
station experience with limited understanding of the complexity of transmission and 
distribution issues, the driver of the chain is necessarily the electricity generation link.  
 
The biggest threat to ESKOM supply generation is the existence of IPPs. The issue here is 
the fact that these are private sector forms of generation, whatever the source of the 
generation – whether it be wind, solar, gas, or competitive coal-fired power stations. From 
their public sector-driven perspective perceiving this is as a threat is a perfectly rational 
mindset. However, their concerns about protecting coal-based power generation backlash 
into alternative feed-in mechanisms to the transmission backbone. Its problems ripple 
through into transmission (which creates roughly 10 per cent of turnover) and distribution 
(about 30 per cent of revenue). ESKOM cannot stop the current march of IPPs and private 
sector renewable energy generation – for the moment it has lost that battle – but because it 
also controls the transmission backbone, it can raise numerous obstructions in respect of 
connecting to the grid, while appearing to be complying.56 Moreover, through its DPE backer 
                                                        
55 This was described by an internal ESKOM expert in the following terms: ‘You need to go through four committees to get 
signed off for the IPPs. To get the proposals through takes five to six committees, five committees for the project charter… You 
need to allocate a two week lead time between each meeting. It is slow moving and an enormous amount of time is wasted in 
committees… We work with other people’s money and the frustrating thing is that instead of getting rid of the bad people that 
take bribes, they try to develop a system that is foolproof, that can’t be corrupted... It slows down the process of connection and 
the net effect is that we are slower to build a substation than the private sector takes to build a [renewable generation] plant’: 
Interview, Ferdi Kruger (ESKOM). 
56 Interview, Anton Eberhard (independent expert). 
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and influence in various committees, it can use this to shift the terms of the renewable 
energy/electricity generation policy debate. This it does fairly effectively, despite increasingly 
frustrated public opinion about its cumbersomeness, inefficiency and cost structure. 
 
One policy solution to this problem of value chain governance that is touted in discussion – 
interestingly, also within ESKOM from those segments not integrally tied into generation – is 
to break up the corporation’s hold over all the links in the electricity value chain. In other 
words, unbundle ESKOM and leave it to be simply concerned with generation. Transmission 
could then be regulated and managed by a different entity with its own costing structure. The 
systems operator and energy planning would be taken out of ESKOM’s control. This entity 
would buy power from all generators including ESKOM and the IPPs, which would then be 
delivered through the transmission network. It could be publicly owned or private sector 
driven. What matters is a single buyer purchasing power from many generating suppliers and 
then selling power to different distributors. From ESKOM’s point of view this is a major threat 
to its key governance component – monopoly control over the value chain – as it would 
immediately break its hold over the transmission and distribution backbone. From a 
renewable energy perspective, however, it would create a level playing field. From the DoE 
perspective it would enormously strengthen the current coalition, ensuring a balanced 
renewable energy profile. 
 
This is the essence of the current ISMO Bill that is floating around parliament, and over 
which the governing party blows hot and cold depending on which faction is able to exercise 
the necessary power over the debate. The DPE, which is ESKOM’s shareholder, would have 
the largest corporation in its stable suddenly reduced in size and power, and is opposed to 
the break-up of ESKOM. This goes as far as internal opposition to creating business units 
with individual costing procedures within ESKOM itself. It is seen as the thin end of the 
wedge threatening the vision of ‘One ESKOM’. 
 
Opposition also comes from the union movement and other leftist factions in government 
who see the break-up of ESKOM’s control over the various links in the value chain as 
preparing for a process of privatisation of state-owned enterprises. The unions are 
concerned about the possible impact on employment as efficiencies get driven through the 
value chain. But it feeds into a generalised ethos of ideological anathema focused on the ills 
of privatisation and the threat to the developmental state which is the unions’ current political 
mantra.  
 
In terms of the coalition, these conflicts and debates produce policy and implementation 
stasis, rather than generating the necessary movement within the state to tackle the systemic 
inefficiencies and blockages in the manner in which the value chain is governed and 
managed. As long as stasis dominates, these inefficiencies can always be used and 
deflected as practical examples caused by renewable energy itself by those intent on 
preserving the status quo, or shifting the energy mix in favour of nuclear, or the need to 
protect coal reserves, etc. – and threaten the currently successful coalition. As one 
interviewee put it, the problem is that ‘no political leader wants to be the person who is seen 
as presiding over the breaking up of ESKOM’. 
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7 Conclusion: coalitions for change 
 
The driving force pushing South Africa into renewable energy policies and modalities of 
implementation was not a result of a major commitment to addressing the issues of climate 
change. The change in the renewable energy policy debate and policy implementation was 
triggered by a crisis in the supply of electricity. This crisis has its roots in the governance of 
the electricity value chain, which took the form of a vertically integrated set of linkages 
(covering generation, transmission and distribution) internalised within the public sector-
owned company, ESKOM. The importance of achieving energy security was brutally put on 
the political agenda by an inability of ESKOM to meet the new demands of a post-apartheid 
period of industrial growth and rapid electrification programmes for the poorer, previously 
disadvantaged segments of South African society. The breakdown of ESKOM’s generating, 
transmission and distribution capacity and rapidly escalating electricity prices shook business 
and residential householders to the core.  
 
The power and influence of ESKOM and its ministerial protectors within government 
(Departments of Public Enterprises, as well as Minerals and Energy) enabled it to turn the 
energy crisis to its own ends. Policy lip service was paid to opening up the space to 
renewable energy through setting up an independent regulatory agency (NERSA) and 
creating a policy framework designed to bring in independent power producers. However, in 
reality this coalition of ESKOM and its government backers blocked rather than facilitated 
both the entry of private sector actors and the move to using renewable energy options. In 
face of the fear of systemic energy and its potential effects on the economy, ESKOM was 
able to use its own failure to reassert its control over the electricity value chain.  
 
The rolling blackouts and demand for massive price increases to fund ESKOM’s new capital 
investment and maintenance costs after a decade of complacency had an initial paralysing 
effect on counter forces within government and society. Despite interest from foreign 
renewable investors, the political economy dynamics resulted in policy incoherence, 
confusion and uncertainty on the part of government. As a result the first renewable energy 
policy framework (REFIT) emerged stillborn.  
 
Ironically for ESKOM, the continuing electricity crisis and its tightening hold on the whole 
value chain produced a crisis of confidence in ESKOM’s ability to ensure energy security for 
the country. A series of unintended consequences – the incoming President Zuma in 
shuffling his cabinet created a new Department of Energy, throwaway commitments he made 
in a speech at COP15 – opened up a space for the formation of a coalition for change 
focused on spreading electricity generation away from ESKOM’s monopoly to include 
renewable energy electricity generation.  
 
Given the energy security crisis and the loss of confidence in ESKOM, it catalysed the 
Treasury to investigate renewable energy alternatives in a new light by allowing a small unit 
skilled in creating public–private partnerships to have its head in investigating setting up 
IPPs. This unit occupied space adjacent to the DoE building, operating and giving credit as if 
it was institutionally located there, brought together a coalition of public and private sector 
support around its activities and produced a competitive bidding implementation platform 
called RE IPPPP which allowed IPP investment to take off and drive tariff prices down in the 
process.  
 
This allowed the DoE to intervene decisively in the policy space, passing new legislation, 
confining NERSA’s role to regulation only and removing it from the IPP selection process; 
and effectively clipping some of ESKOM’s power to control purchasing from IPPs. The result 
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was to shift the balance of forces in the energy political economy space away from ESKOM’s 
paralysing grip over the value chain. ESKOM still remains a very powerful actor in the terrain 
of electricity generation, transmission and distribution, but for the moment its total monopoly 
has been weakened. In short, this has resulted in a current structural break with the previous 
period, manifested in policy shifts and operational changes, reflecting the power of a new 
coalition of influence in the political economy of renewables. Whether this leads to the 
required corporate unbundling of ESKOM and an electricity value chain operating without its 
stultifying monopoly control is the political economy challenge facing a new coalition for 
change. 
 
Figure 7.157 provides a static snapshot of the various stakeholders and their relative influence 
in respect of this current periodisation of renewable energy policy. It provides a visual 
representation of the different stakeholders – their relative levels of influence, their main 
priority, and their stance on the new renewable energy policy direction of RE IPPPP. It shows 
the relative position of the various stakeholders – government, business and civil society – in 
terms of these dimensions. Their primary priority is reflected on the horizontal axis and their 
relative influence in respect of this new renewable energy policy initiative is shown as ‘for’ 
and ‘against’ RE IPPPP on the vertical axis.  
 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates that the coalition for change is currently in a relatively powerful 
position. In the public sector its core is comprised of the Treasury, DoE, DEA and NERSA, 
with conditional support from DTI. Private sector core support is principally derived from the 
foreign-owned IPP companies and other ancillary business professionals/owners tied to, or 
benefiting from, their operations. The EIUG and other large corporations are primarily 
concerned with energy security and low prices. As long as this is not threatened by 
renewable energy policy their position is relatively neutral. If new opportunities came up 
which allowed some of the coal mines to move into private sector coal-based power stations 
then they would most likely jump at this and abandon a long-standing historical alliance with 
ESKOM, which has already suffered some tension from having to bear the brunt of power 
shortages.  
 
In the current scenario, in civil society the householder associations unions are either fairly 
neutral or too busy fighting their own battles. The municipalities who feel the brunt of 
householder ire, and in that sense are close to civil society pressure, are also located in a 
relatively neutral space as long as their economic fundraising interests are not jeopardised 
and their voting constituencies are not aroused. NGOs linked to climate change are strongly 
in support but, given the low profile this issue has among an array of societal concerns, this 
is not a substantial source of powerful influence.  
 
 
                                                        
57 The derivation of this graphic representation is explained in footnote 28. 
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Figure 7.1 Mapping coalitions in RE IPPPP – supporting and opposing stakeholders by degree of influence and 
priority 
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The key stakeholders arraigned against are ESKOM and DPE. As is clear from the size of 
the bubbles, they form a powerful and substantial bloc whose power is not to be 
underestimated. They are simply keeping their powder dry since fundamentally their 
interests and control over the electricity value chain are not threatened. ESKOM’s 
occupation of the coal-generating capacity space going forward is still overwhelmingly 
substantial, and its grasp over the IPP agenda has simply been loosened. Existing 
discussions taking place in government about expanding the IPP terrain to include private 
sector coal-fuelled power plants are a threat to ESKOM’s monopoly control over the coal-
based energy generation link. Moreover, although there is not a serious attempt to 
unbundle the vertically integrated value chain of generation, transmission and distribution 
under its public sector governance, this might be viewed as the thin edge of the wedge. On 
the renewable energy front ESKOM is simply lying dormant, albeit grumpily and in bad faith. 
If the break-up of the integrated value chain is put on a serious policy agenda then ESKOM 
is most certainly likely to strike back with some considerable exercise of power. Moreover, if 
the unbundling process was to happen, and if it were viewed by ESKOM as directly linked 
to the renewable energy policy direction or as a process of privatisation, then the unions are 
likely to swing substantially against a green growth energy trajectory.  
 
The coalition appears to be strong and on a roll but this is deceptive. It has a number of soft 
underbelly areas, some of which have been extensively discussed in the section on 
challenges and in the periodisation narrative, which render it still fragile in some respects. 
Moreover, as the coalition is ultimately still very dependent on internal government 
configurations, and hence potentially shifting political alignments, this could exacerbate its 
weaknesses. All this is not to say that one is expecting a roll back of renewable energy but 
that one should be very cautious of being overly optimistic and complacent.  
 
Finally, just as unintended consequences derived from other processes have opened up 
space and changed the trajectory of the renewable energy drive in positive ways, so the 
opposite can also occur. The current political desire of President Zuma and key members of 
the ANC government to benefit from nuclear energy deals with other states – the most 
prominent being Russia – may well have the unintended consequence of constraining or 
shifting this trajectory in new, less positive directions.  
 
In summary then, the structural shift creating a formal platform for a renewable energy path 
was heavily dependent on building a supportive coalition of stakeholders across a diverse 
base. The formal programme has been created. The rules of engagement by independent 
power producers have been accepted. A dynamic with significant momentum in this 
direction has been unleashed. Large amounts of FDI have been invested. The balance of 
forces driving electricity generation has significantly shifted over the past few years. In short 
the political economy terrain has altered significantly. However, the future trajectory of 
sustainable energy is by no means assured.  
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Annex 1 Key experts interviewed 
 
Key expert Position 
Karen Breytenbach Senior project advisor for the National Treasury, PPP and IPP Unit; 
leader in the development and current implementation of the        
RE IPPPP programme under the DoE’s IPP Unit 
Rod Crompton 
 
Current full-time regulator member at NERSA. Former member of 
COSATU’s Central Executive Committee, executive member of the 
International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers 
Union; former director of Minerals and Energy Policy Centre; former 
director of chemical and allied industries at the DTI, deputy director 
general, hydrocarbons, at the DME, and participant in the process 
of formulating the White Paper on Energy Policy and the White 
Paper on Renewable Energy. 
Anton Eberhard Professor at the UCT Graduate School of Business; lead expert in 
the management and reform of South Africa’s electricity sector, 
introduction of IPPs, and transformation of SOEs; policy advisor for 
the DPE, DoE and Department of Science and Technology. 
Jon Kornik Past experience in carbon asset management and climate change 
consulting in South Africa; involved in the formation of the South 
African Renewables Initiative (SARI); currently employed by Google 
under its Energy Access & Investments division. 
Ferdi Kruger Chief engineer at ESKOM, involved with price modelling of energy 
planning scenarios, PPA negotiations with IPPs, contract 
management with short-term IPPs; former regulatory specialist at 
NERSA involved in technical and pricing support for evaluation of 
ESKOM’s multi-year revenue application. 
Andre Otto Currently the renewable energy technical advisor at South African 
National Energy Development Institute (SANEDI) under the DoE. 
Past project manager of the South African Wind Energy 
Programme under the DoE and director of new and renewable 
energy at DoE.  
Belynda Petrie 
 
Expert on regional and international climate change adaptation and 
mitigation; led the Southern African Regional Climate Change 
Programme (RCCP); chief executive of OneWorld Group, a 
sustainable development consultancy, based in Cape Town. 
John Taylor Managing director at Fieldstone Private Capital Group; focus on 
projects in power and infrastructure industries – specifically with 
private sector bid development for RE IPPPP; experience advising 
NERSA and ESKOM on co-generation development.  
Hilton Trollip Faculty member at the University of Cape Town’s Energy Research 
Centre and senior researcher with Idasa’s Economic Governance 
Programme; principal engineer for the Energy and Climate Change 
Unit under the Environmental Resource Management Department 
for the City of Cape Town. 
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